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In consumer contracts highly sophisticated corporations will 
often exploit consumers’ behavioral biases. Competition cannot cure 
such exploitation. On the contrary, competitive forces compel sellers 
to take advantage of consumers’ weaknesses. This general theme is 
demonstrated through a detailed case study of the credit card market. 
In designing the credit card contract, issuers deviate from efficient 
marginal-cost pricing in order to take advantage of consumers’ 
underestimation of their future borrowing. This prevalent bias 
explains several unique features of the credit card contract, including 
high interest rates, zero annual and per transaction fees, teaser rates, 
high late and over-limit fees, benefits programs, and low (and even 
negative) amortization rates. The identified market failure suggests 
that legal intervention may be required to protect consumers and to 
increase social welfare. Several specific policy responses are 
considered, including disclosure, regulation of unsolicited offers, 
unbundling of transacting and borrowing services, and usury ceilings. 
The role of contract law and bankruptcy law is also examined. More 
broadly, the credit card case study demonstrates that pricing patterns 
can be used as indicators of a behavioral market failure, signaling a 
potential role for legal intervention.  
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Consumer contracts are characterized by an asymmetry between 
the two parties, the seller of a good or the provider of a service on the 
one hand and the consumer on the other.  One party is usually a 
highly sophisticated corporation, the other—an individual, prone to 
the behavioral flaws that make us human.  Absent legal intervention, 
the sophisticated seller will often exploit the consumer’s behavioral 
biases.  The contract itself, commonly designed by the seller, will be 
shaped around consumers’ systematic deviations from perfect 
rationality.  Such biased contracting is not the consequence of 
imperfect competition.  On the contrary, competitive forces compel 
sellers to take advantage of consumers’ weaknesses.  
This broad theme is developed within a detailed case study of the 
credit card market and the credit card contract.  Credit cards present a 
significant socio-economic phenomenon.  In 2000, consumers used 
1.44 billion  credit cards, i.e. almost 14 cards per household, to 
purchase an estimated $1,463 billion of goods and services.  The 
average household completed $14,000 of credit card transactions, 
about 33 percent of the median household income.
1  Not only are 
credit cards important, they are also dangerous.  Credit card debt, 
which amounted to $683 billion in 2000, is a notoriously prominent 
component of overall consumer debt, and a leading culprit in 
consumer bankruptcy cases.
2 
Congress has repeatedly debated different policy responses to the 
credit card problem.
3  Recent legislation targets surprise jumps in 
                                                 
1 Bureau of the Census, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2002 § 25, 
tbls. 51, 652, 1165 (hereinafter “Statistical Abstract”). 
2 Statistical Abstract, supra note 1, tbl. 1164-65. See also Thomas A. Durkin, 
Consumers and Credit Disclosures: Credit Cards and Credit Insurance, FED. 
RESERVE BULL., April 2002, at 202 (“Much of the growth of consumer credit in 
recent years has been in the form of revolving credit, of which credit card credit is 
the largest component.”); TERESA  A.  SULLIVAN,  ELIZABETH  WARREN  &  JAY 
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 129 
(2000) (“As the fastest growing proportion of consumer debt, credit card debt has 
led the way to bankruptcy for an increasing number of Americans . . . .”); Charles 
A. Docter, Impact of Credit Card Use on Consumer Bankruptcies, 1998 ABI JNL. 
LEXIS 25 (citing a May 1997 CNN/USA Today/Gallop Poll as well as other 
evidence suggesting that credit card bills are the foremost cause of consumer 
bankruptcy); Hae Won Choi & Gordon Fairclough, Payback Time: After Credit 
Binge In South Korea, Big Bill Comes Due, WALL STREET JOURNAL, 1/20/04, pp. 
A1, A10 (Mounting credit card debt rocks the South Korean financial system). 
3 In particular, Congress repeatedly debated whether to reinstate usury ceilings.   
See, e.g., H.R. 78, 100
th Cong. (1987), S. 242, 100
th Cong. (1987), S. 647, 100
th 
Cong. (1987), H.R. 3769, 102
nd Cong. (1991), H.R. 3860, 102
nd Cong. (1991), 
S.AMDTs 1333-34 to S.543, 102
nd Cong. (1991), H.R. 4132, 103
rd Cong. (1994).  
The many proposed usury bills did not mature into law. Rather, Congress opted for 
a mandatory disclosure policy, as part of the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1601 et seq. 
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credit card interest rates.
4  Credit cards also figure prominently in the 
pending bankruptcy reform legislation.
5  The Supreme Court is 
similarly concerned about the credit card market, having recently 
granted certiorari to consider issues pertaining to the definition of 
finance charges under the Truth-in-Lending Act.
6  Last but not least, 
the academic literature has engaged the credit card debate, examining 
the need for legal intervention in the credit card market, and 
proposing different policy solutions to the credit card problem. 
This Article seeks to reframe the credit card debate and, using 
insights from behavioral law and economics, to offer a fresh 
perspective on the causes and potential cures of the credit card 
problem.  As a first step, the Article offers a broader perspective on 
the credit card contract, extending beyond the interest rate dimension.  
Several unique features of the credit card contract, such as low 
introductory rates that appear alongside high long-term interest rates, 
zero annual and per-transaction fees, large penalties for late payment 
and for deviations from the credit limit, and low (and even negative) 
amortization rates, must all be considered.  In particular, a theory of 
credit card pricing must explain why (non-introductory) interest rates, 
as well as late and over-limit fees, are set well above marginal cost, 
while annual and per-transaction fees are set below marginal cost 
(and, accounting for the benefits programs associated with most credit 
cards, might even amount to setting a negative price).  
The behavioral theory developed in this Article explains the 
staggering levels of credit card borrowing, and sheds light on the 
unique design of the credit card contract.  At the foundation of the 
proposed theory is a combination of behavioral biases that results in 
the underestimation of future borrowing.  
The first underlying bias involves imperfect self-control, or an 
underappreciated weakness of the will.  Perhaps the first story of 
imperfect self-control is that of Ulysses and the Sirens.
7  Ulysses 
ordered his crew to tie him to the mast of the ship, knowing that while 
he wished to avoid the danger of the Sirens, the sound of their 
enchanting Song would cause him to disregard all danger and steer 
ship and crew towards certain doom.  But not everyone has Ulysses’ 
foresight.  While on the treadmill, the dieter may promise himself that 
he will forsake dessert when he dines out that evening.  But at the 
restaurant, when the dessert cart is steered past the table and his 
                                                 
4 See The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, specifically § 311 
amending 15 U.S.C. 1681m to provide for “adverse action notices” of less favorable 
credit terms offered based on a consumer report.  See also Jennifer Bayot, Surprise 
Jumps in Credit Rates Bring Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2003, at A1, C4. 
5 H.R. 975, 108
th Cong. (2003). 
6 See Pfennig v. Household Credit Services, Inc., No. 00-4213 (6
th Cir., July 2, 
2002), cert. granted Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig, No. 02-0857 (June 
27, 2003). 
7 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 198-204 (Anchor Press, Doubleday, 1963). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press  SEDUCTION BY PLASTIC 3 
 
 
mouth starts to water, he caves in and orders the chocolate cake.
8  
How many New Years’ resolutions to regularly attend the gym or 
health club are quickly forgotten when February replaces January (or 
even earlier)?
9  How often are alarm clocks set with best intentions in 
mind, only to be turned off and ignored the next morning?
10 Imperfect 
self-control also plagues consumption and savings decisions, 
accounting for the rampant problem of insufficient saving for 
retirement.
11  And weakness of the will also explains consumers’ 
underestimation of their future borrowing.  Often the consumer will 
end up borrowing on her credit card, despite her ex ante intentions not 
to borrow. 
The second bias underlying the underestimation of future 
borrowing is the optimism bias.  Consumers tend to underestimate the 
likelihood of adverse events that might necessitate borrowing.   
Optimistic individuals tend to underestimate the probability of being 
involved in an accident that might generate high medical bills or other 
liquidity needs.  Similarly, individuals tend to underestimate the 
probability that either they or a loved one will become ill and require 
costly treatment (that is not covered, or not entirely covered by their 
insurance plan).  Finally, individuals tend to underestimate the 
likelihood that they will lose their job, or the time it will take them to 
find a new job.  These and other manifestations of the optimism bias 
lead consumers to underestimate the likelihood that they will incur a 
liquidity shock that necessitates a resort to credit card borrowing. 
The underestimation bias can explain the unique pricing patterns 
in the credit card market.  If consumers underestimate their future 
borrowing, issuers can be expected to raise the long-term, borrowing-
contingent elements of the credit card price.  Thus, interest rates as 
well as late and over-limit fees are set above marginal cost, since 
consumers are insufficiently sensitive to variation in these long-term 
elements of the credit card price.  On the other hand, competition in 
                                                 
8 See RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF 
ECONOMIC  LIFE 98 (1992) (illustrating bounded will-power using the dieting 
example). 
9  See Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Overestimating Self-Control: 
Evidence from the Health Club Industry (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author) (presenting evidence of health club attendance). 
10 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 58 (1984) (illustrating 
bounded will-power using the alarm-clock example). 
11 See Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence 
and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (1991) (“Left to their own devices, 
many people will not save enough for their old age.”); Brigitte C. Madrian & 
Dennis Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings 
Behavior, 116 QUART. J. ECON. 1149, 1150 (2001) (documenting the problem of 
insufficient saving for retirement); David Laibson et al., Self-Control and Saving for 
Retirement, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 91 (1998) (presenting evidence 
of and a theoretical explanation for the insufficient saving problem); Ted 
O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Procrastination in Preparing for Retirement, in 
BEHAVIORAL  DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT  ECONOMICS 125 (Henry Aaron ed., 
1999) (same). 
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the credit card market forces issuers to compensate for these high 
long-term prices by under-pricing the short-term, non-contingent 
elements of the credit card contract, which are not subject to the 
underestimation bias.  To attract consumers, issuers must resort to 
below-marginal-cost (and even negative) prices in setting annual and 
per-transaction fees as well as introductory, short-term interest rates 
(teaser rates).  
The analysis in this Article portrays the credit card contract as a 
tool designed to exploit consumers’ underestimation bias.   
Interestingly, if the credit card market is indeed as competitive as it 
appears to be, issuers have to exploit consumers’ imperfect rationality 
in order to survive in this market.  Issuers that do not take advantage 
of the underestimation bias, and offer lower interest rates instead of 
short-term perks, would not succeed in the marketplace.  Consumers, 
failing to appreciate the value of reduced interest rates, would take 
their business elsewhere.  
The ongoing debate over the need to regulate the credit card 
market has largely focused on the profitability of credit card issuers.  
Proponents of regulation argue that high interest rates generate supra-
competitive profits for issuers.
12  Opponents of legal intervention 
argue that supra-competitive profits are a myth.
13  The analysis in this 
Article suggests that the focus on profits is misguided.  According to 
the behavioral theory developed here, it is perfectly plausible that 
issuers, operating in a highly competitive market, are exploiting 
consumer biases without making supra-competitive profits.  The 
underestimation bias does not eliminate the competition in the credit 
card market; it diverts competition from the interest rate to other, 
short-term components of the credit card contract.  Competition still 
dissipates supra-competitive rents, but it does so through low (and 
even negative) per-account and per-transaction fees, teaser rates, and 
frequent flyer miles, rather than through lower interest rates.  
Even in the absence of supra-competitive profits, legal 
intervention may be required to prevent the potentially significant 
welfare costs generated by the underestimation bias.  Competition in 
the credit card market is distorted by this bias.  Instead of bringing 
down interest rates, and eliminating late and over-limit fees, 
competition is focused only on short-term perks: annual and per-
transaction fees, teaser rates, and benefits programs.  While 
consumers undeniably enjoy these transitory perks, the long-term 
costs outweigh any short-term benefit, because the long-term costs hit 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, ch. 5; Lawrence M. 
Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. ECON. 
REV. 50 (1991). 
13 See, e.g., DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC 
251-56 (1999) (devoting a section to “The Myth of Exorbitant Profits”); Todd J. 
Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 128-146 (2000) 
(criticizing claims of supra-competitive profits enjoyed by credit card issuers). 
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the consumer when she is most vulnerable, when financial distress 
forces her to borrow. 
In addition, the biased competition in the credit card market leads 
to distorted incentives.  When price equals marginal cost, a buyer will 
buy if and only if she values the good or service more than its cost.  
Marginal-cost pricing aligns private incentives with the social 
objective of welfare maximization.  Goods and services are produced 
only when the benefit exceeds the cost, and an optimal allocation of 
resources is achieved.   
In the credit card market, prices systematically deviate from 
marginal cost.  The underestimation bias distorts competitive forces 
leading to above-marginal-cost pricing of long-term price elements, 
and to below-marginal-cost pricing of short-term price elements.   
Importantly, the below-marginal-cost pricing of some elements does 
not compensate for the above-marginal-cost pricing of other elements.  
Each type of deviation generates its own independent distortion.  Zero 
annual and per-transaction fees, coupled with benefits programs, 
result in too many credit cards and in excessive use of these cards.  
And, teaser rates lead to excessive pre-distress borrowing, which in 
turn renders the consumer more vulnerable to financial hardships.   
Moreover, benefits programs offered by credit card issuers might 
skew prices and distort incentives beyond the credit card market, 
leading to over-consumption. 
Not only efficiency is threatened by the distorted pricing in the 
credit card market.   The systematic overpricing of credit services and 
underpricing of transacting services means that transactors are being 
cross-subsidized by borrowers.  This troubling distributive effect 
further suggests the need to consider legal intervention in the credit 
card market.   
These welfare costs provide a prima  facie case for legal 
intervention.  The underestimation bias that underlies the identified 
welfare costs also qualifies the no-intervention presumption of the 
freedom-of-contract paradigm.  If a contracting party misconceives 
the future consequences of the contract, then the normative power of 
contractual consent is significantly weakened.  
This Article challenges the no-intervention position.  It does not 
make an affirmative case for intervention.  To make such a case 
would require a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the proposed 
policy response.  Rather, the Article identifies the major legal avenues 
available to policymakers concerned with the repercussions of the 
underestimation bias.  
Starting with the least controversial mode of legal intervention, 
the Article considers the potential role of disclosure.  The 
underestimation model suggests, however, that merely disclosing the 
interest rate in the credit card offer, even in a salient way, is not 
enough.  If a consumer believes that she will not borrow on her card, 
she will not mind the high interest rate, no matter how large the font.  
To be effective, the required disclosures must target consumers’ 
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underestimation bias.  For instance, the Truth-in-Lending Act
14 can be 
amended to require that personalized warnings of projected debt and 
its consequences be added to the monthly credit card bill.  
A second mild form of intervention focuses on the design of 
default rules.  In the credit card market, the ubiquitous unsolicited 
credit offers provide a natural target for default-rule-type regulation.  
For instance, it may be desirable to categorically prohibit the use of 
excessive late and over-limit fees, negative amortization rates and 
even some types of teaser rates in unsolicited offers.  Since a 
sophisticated consumer, who really wants a high interest rate, can get 
it by requesting and completing an application, even strict regulation 
of unsolicited offers is tantamount to a default rule, thus alleviating 
many anti-regulation concerns. 
A third form of legal intervention targets the bundling of 
transacting and financing services achieved by the credit card.  This 
bundling facilitates the pricing distortions observed in the credit card 
market.  Absent financing and penalty revenues, issuers would not be 
able to offer free cards and generous benefit programs.  The Article 
considers the role of charge cards and debit cards in affecting the 
desired unbundling, concluding that without regulatory help these 
competitors can expect only limited success vis-à-vis the credit card.  
A second unbundling policy, forcing issuers to offer an automatic 
payment option from the consumer’s checking account, is also 
considered. 
A fourth, more controversial policy, usury ceilings, is considered 
next.  While no affirmative case for usury caps is made, the 
underestimation theory qualifies the traditional objection to usury 
ceilings, namely that such price regulation would only limit the 
availability of credit, hurting the very consumers it sets-out to protect.  
The proposed theory suggests that a credit card usury cap will likely 
induce issuers to readjust their pricing practices—to place more 
weight on the short-term elements of the credit card price.  The 
overall price of credit, and thus the availability of credit, need not 
change.  Moreover, credit card usury caps should be distinguished 
from a broad usury law applicable to all forms of financing.  The 
credit card law might induce substitution from credit card financing, 
which is uniquely vulnerable to the underestimation bias, to 
alternative forms of financing (e.g. bank loans); it should not 
significantly limit the overall availability of credit. 
The Article also considers the potential role of ex post judicial 
review of credit card contracts, specifically through contract law and 
bankruptcy law.  Courts have occasionally upheld common law 
claims against card issuers.  Generally, however, they have been 
reluctant to intervene in the credit card market.  This hands-off 
approach is likely justified.  Given the institutional limitations of 
                                                 
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. 
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common law adjudication, ex ante regulation should be the preferred 
mode of legal intervention in the credit card market. 
As argued at the outset, the credit card problem is just one 
example, though an important one, of a much broader phenomenon.  
Many consumer contracts are controlled by sophisticated sellers, who 
design these contracts to exploit consumers’ limited will-power and 
imperfect rationality.
15  Market forces cannot be relied upon to cure 
this problem; in fact, they exacerbate it.  From a policy perspective, 
the credit card case study demonstrates that observed pricing patterns 
can be used as indicators of such a behavioral market failure.   
Specifically, deviations from marginal-cost pricing in what otherwise 
appears to be a competitive market should draw policymakers’ 
attention. 
Applying this logic, I identify the cell phone market as another 
market where an underestimation bias distorts competition, 
suggesting that legal intervention should be considered.  The 
framework developed in this Article applies also to contracts signed 
outside the scope of a well-developed market (such as the credit card 
or cell phone markets).   
Even where pricing anomalies would be more difficult to 
identify, the proposed behavioral theory can single out specific 
provisions and contracting practices for special scrutiny.  For 
instance, the underestimation theory provides a novel perspective on 
the casebook favorite, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
16 
where the conscionability of the repossession clause in an installment 
purchase contract was reviewed.  More broadly, the commonly-
observed pro-seller provisions governing breach contingencies can be 
explained as the rational response to consumers’ underestimation 
bias.
17 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows.  Section I 
presents the credit card—its functions, history and economic 
significance, the credit card industry, and the credit card market.   
Section II describes the unique patterns in credit card pricing, 
focusing on the systematic deviations from marginal-cost pricing.   
Section III develops the underestimation theory, and uses it to explain 
credit card pricing.  Section IV identifies the welfare costs of the 
biased competition in the credit card market, and suggests that legal 
intervention should be considered.  Section V explores specific policy 
responses.  Section VI draws the broader lessons from the credit card 
case study, and applies them to the cell phone market and to other 
contractual settings.  Section VII concludes. 
 
                                                 
15 Cf. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The 
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U.  L.  REV. 630, 636-37 (1999) 
(Manufacturers of risky products manipulate consumers’ behavioral biases.) 
16 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
17 See infra Section VI.C.2. 
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I.  THE CREDIT CARD 
 
A.  The Two Functions of Credit Cards 
 
What is a credit card? It is a flat,  ' ' 3 8
3  by  ' ' 2 8
1  piece of plastic 
engraved with a name and an account number.  But it is also a 
representation that allows its holder to perform two distinct tasks – to 
transact quickly and efficiently, and to borrow, to finance a specific 
purchase, business, or way of life.  The transacting and financing 
functions, while combined in one piece of plastic, are very different.  
They constitute two distinct services provided by the credit card 
issuer – two services purposefully linked together in one plastic 
card.
18 
The credit card holder need not make use of both functions. Some 
transact, but do not borrow.  These transactors use the credit card only 
as a method of payment.  While the transactors group is by no means 
insignificant, the majority of cardholders use both the transacting and 
financing services provided by their plastic card.
19 
 
B.  The Development and Importance of the Credit Card 
 
1.  History 
 
Where does the phrase “credit card” come from? The term was 
coined by Edward Bellamy in his 1887 utopian socialist novel, 
Looking Backward.  Bellamy provides a futuristic account of the year 
2000,  when credit cards had entirely supplanted cash.
20 
The history of consumer credit, in the modern sense, begins in the 
early twentieth century, when Sears, Roebuck and Company was 
lending money to its customers so that they could buy the goods Sears 
had to sell.  Thus, the merchant card (or retail card) was born.
21  The 
                                                 
18 The implication of this bundling of transacting and borrowing services are 
discussed in Section III.B.2 infra. 
19 See Ausubel, supra note 12, at 71-2 (“typically three-quarters of active credit 
card accounts at major banks are incurring these high finance charges . . . .”); 
SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 110 (“[T]hree out of four of 
[all households that have at least one credit card] also carry credit card debt from 
month to month.”); EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 211 (transactors 
“comprise roughly a third of cardholders but account for about half of charge 
volume”); Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: 
Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RESERVE 
BULL., January 2003, at 24-5 (According to 2001 SCF data, 44.4% of households 
carry credit card debt; among the 72.7% of households holding at least one bank-
card, 53.7% carry a balance.) 
20 Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Credit Card Industry: A History, by Lewis Mandell, 
30 J. ECON. LIT. 1517, 1518 (1992) (book review). 
21 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 109 (“Sears, and then other 
retailers, gave consumers the credit that banks would not give them.”)  The 
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merchant card, however, while providing the consumer with valuable 
credit, was only accepted by the merchant that provided the specific 
card. 
The path to the modern credit card proceeds through the so-called 
Travel & Entertainment (T&E) cards, special-purpose charge cards 
that in time evolved into all-purpose cards.  The Diner’s Club card led 
the way, first appearing in 1949, followed by American Express and 
Carte Blanche, which entered the market in 1958.
22  The T&E cards, 
while gradually evolving into all-purpose cards, were still charge 
cards, rather than credit cards – the balance on these cards was due in 
full at the end of each month.
23 
In the mid-1960s, with the advent of the Visa and MasterCard 
systems, the modern credit card was born, combining the all-purpose 
feature of the evolved T&E cards with the credit feature of the 
merchant cards.
24  The Visa and MasterCard bankcards grew rapidly, 
adding more and more bank-issuers and merchants to their networks.  
American Express joined the credit card scene with its Optima card in 
the late 1980s. In 1985, Sears Roebuck & Co. introduced its own all-
purpose credit card, the Discover card.
25  “By the 1990s the all-
purpose card gained dominance over traditional store cards, making it 
possible for millions of card holders to charge anything from their 
dental fillings to their parking tickets.”
26 
Yet, the initial steps on the road to success were somewhat shaky.  
With strict usury laws in place, issuers were initially losing money on 
their credit card business.
27  The banking industry sought to overcome 
the strict interest rate ceilings in an ingenious way.  Rather than 
lobbying each state legislature for more lenient usury laws, the 
industry targeted, in the Federal courts, the jurisdictional issue of the 
                                                                                                                  
company’s first application form asked, “How long at your present address?” and 
“How many cows do you milk?” Id. 
22 Id. See also L EWIS MANDELL, THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY 1-3 
(1990) (an historical account of the conception of the Diner’s card); EVANS  & 
SCHMALENSEE,  supra note 13, at 10-11 (describing the entry of the American 
Express and Carte Blanche cards). 
23 Charge cards still allow for 15 days of credit on average (EVANS  & 
SCHMALENSEE,  supra note 13, at 27); but this credit element is secondary and 
relatively minor compared to the financing services provided by credit cards. 
24 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 109. See also EVANS & 
SCHMALENSEE,  supra note 13, at 10-11 (describing the entry of the all-purpose 
bankcards).  
25 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 10-11. 
26 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 109. Recently, store cards 
seem to be regaining momentum. 
27 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 68-9, 73. See also Lawrence M. 
Ausubel,  Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. 
BANKR.  L.J. 249, 260-61 (1997) (“Before 1982, credit card interest rates were 
subject to usury ceilings in most states.  These ceilings on interest rates limited 
credit card profitability during periods, such as 1974-1975 and 1980-1981, when 
market interest rates on Treasury bills and corporate bonds spiked upward.  This led 
to a sharply-reduced or negative return on assets for credit card activity during such 
years.”) 
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“exportation” of interest rates; the question being “which state's usury 
ceiling constrains the interest rate if a bank located in one state issues 
a credit card to a consumer in a different state.”
28  
Finally, in 1978, the exportation question reached the United 
States Supreme Court. The Court, in Marquette National Bank v. First 
of Omaha Service Corporation,
29 ruled that the applicable usury 
ceiling was the one set by the state where the issuing bank was 
located.
30  In effect, the Supreme Court “gave banks the option of 
shifting their credit card operations to wholly owned subsidiaries 
situated in states without usury laws.”
31  The Marquette decision fired 
the opening shot in the inter-state race to attract credit card issuers.  
To win this race, or at least to prevent an exodus of banks from the 
state, many states substantially increased their interest caps, or 
revoked their usury laws altogether.
32  T h e  Marquette decision 
produced a functionally deregulated credit card market.  Moreover, 
the decision enabled credit card issuers to operate on a national level 
and thus to enjoy scale economies.
33  
The sky-high inflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s lifted the 
final barrier to the profitability of the credit card industry.  With the 
effective abolition of usury laws, credit card interest rates rose to 
match the high inflation rates.  In fact, the causation probably worked 
in both directions; the high inflation rates were likely instrumental in 
bringing about the legal changes (specifically the Marquette decision) 
that triggered the effective abolition of usury ceilings.
34  Either way, 
credit card interest rates rose with inflation. 
As high inflation justified raising interest rates in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, the subsequent decline in the inflation rate starting in 
1982-83 might have been expected to produce a reduction in credit 
card interest rates.  This reduction, however, never came.
35 
                                                 
28 See Ausubel, supra note 27, at 260-61. 
29 439 U.S. 299 (1978) (henceforth “the Marquette decision”). 
30 Id. at 310-12. In Marquette the Court interpreted 12 U.S.C. § 85. 
31 Ausubel, supra note 12, at 52. 
32  Id.; SULLIVAN,  WARREN  &  WESTBROOK,  supra note 2, at 248-49; EVANS  & 
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 6; Vincent D. Rougeau, Rediscovering Usury: An 
Argument for Legal Controls on Credit Card Interest Rates, 67 COLO. L. REV. 1, 9-
10 (1996). 
33 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 71-72. 
34  See S ULLIVAN,  WARREN  &  WESTBROOK,  supra note 2, at 248-9 (“All that 
changed with the sky-high inflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s. With inflation 
in double digits, Congress and the Supreme Court effectively legalized what had 
been usury, overriding the restrictive state laws.”) 
35 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 255 (“[T]he single biggest 
cost for a credit card issuer is the cost of funds for the money it lends to borrowers 
who repay over time.  Between 1980 and 1992, the rate at which banks borrow 
money fell from 13.4 percent to 3.5 percent.  During the same time, the average 
credit card interest rate rose from 17.3 percent to 17.8 percent.  Thus during the 
period that the credit card issuers’ largest cost was plummeting, they were raising 
the price of credit to their consumers.”) 
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The history of the credit card industry is marked by declining 
costs and sticky interest rates.
36  These high interest rates, which 
stubbornly fail to keep up with the declining cost of funds, have 
allowed credit card issuers to offer more credit and to target less 
credit-worthy consumers.
37  The result was an explosion of consumer 
credit, leading to a dramatic expansion of consumer debt and also to 
an increase in consumer bankruptcy rates.
38  Ensuing attempts to 
reinstate some form of usury law have all failed.
39 
 
2.  Economic Significance 
 
Credit cards are a major method of payment, and their prevalence 
and importance is only growing.  By 1995, credit cards had already 
surpassed cash as a method of payment.
40  In 2000, consumers used 
1.44 billion  credit cards, i.e. almost 14 cards per household, to 
purchase an estimated $1,463 billion of goods and services.  The 
average household completed $14,000 of credit card transactions, 
about 33 percent of the median household income.
41  In a recent 
study, Gross and Souleles note that “[a]bout 20 percent of aggregate 
personal consumption is already being purchased using credit cards . . 
. .”
42  
The credit card industry has experienced a significant growth rate 
– as measured by transaction volume, number of cards in circulation, 
                                                 
36 Id. at 18-19, 248-49; Ausubel, supra note 12, at 53-55; MANDELL, supra note 22, 
at 79. 
37 Alternatively, the declining cost of funds lead issuers to extend credit to less 
credit-worthy consumers, and the increased risk prevented the decline in interest 
rates. 
38 Diane Ellis, The Effect of Consume Interest Rate Deregulation on Credit Cad 
Volumes, Charge-Offs and the Personal Bankruptcy Rate, 98-05 BANK  TRENDS 
(1998) (identifying the link between the repeal of usury rates, the increase in 
consumer credit, and the rise in bankruptcy filing rates).  The historical link 
between the rise of the credit card and the explosion of consumer debt is quite 
significant.  See James Medoff & Andrew Harless, THE  INDEBTED  SOCIETY: 
ANATOMY OF AN ONGOING DISASTER 9 (1996) (“Since the introduction of credit 
cards, the debt level of the typical American has risen far out of proportion to his or 
her income.”).  
39 See supra note 3. 
40  See S ULLIVAN,  WARREN  &  WESTBROOK,  supra note 2, at 108; EVANS  & 
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 25-6.  In 2001, payment cards were used in 32% 
of purchased value, as compared to a 43% use of checks and a 19% use of cash.  See 
Statistical Abstract, supra note 1, tbl. 1162.  Unless noted otherwise, the data 
presented in this Article is U.S. data. For an excellent comparative account, see 
Ronald J. Mann, Credit Card Policy in a Globalized World (2004) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
41 See supra note 1. 
42 David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest 
Rates Mater for Consumer Behavior? Evidence from Credit Card Data, 117 QUAR. 
J. ECON. 149, 151 (2002). 




43  And with the rise of e-commerce there is 
reason to expect that the industry will continue to experience 
significant growth.
44 
For most consumers, credit cards have become a way of life.
45  
While in 1970 only 16% of households had credit cards (and half of 
these households were among the top 25% in terms of income), all but 
the poorest households had ready access to credit cards as early as the 
1980s.
46  A recent study by Laibson et al. reports that 80% of 
households have at least one credit card (including store cards).
47  The 
average monthly household charge was over $1100 in 2000, as 
compared to only $125 in 1970 (in current dollars).  The ratio of 
charges to income grew from just under 4% in 1970 to about 33% in 
2000.
48  And this growth is not solely attributable to the phenomenon 
of credit cards displacing other methods of payment.  A growing body 
of evidence suggests that credit cards encourage spending.
49 
                                                 
43 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 235-36 (“Between 1971 and 1997, 
the number of cards in circulation increased by more than 900 percent, while the 
number of households increased by only 54 percent.  The total dollar value of credit 
card transactions increased by 2,630 percent in that same period while personal 
consumption expenditures increased by 125 percent.  Finally, outstanding balances 
increased by 2,700 percent while total consumer credit outstanding increased by 140 
percent . . . . Payment cards have grown at the expense of other means of payment 
and other sources of credit.”) 
44 See Gross & Souleles, supra note 42, at 151; CARD INDUSTRY DIRECTORY, 2002 
EDITION 10-11 (Sandra L. Budde ed., 2001).  The continued growth of the credit 
card industry is also based, to a large degree, on international prospects. See EVANS 
& SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 52. 
45 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 19, 111 (noting a change in 
popular culture geared toward more purchasing and debt). 
46 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 85-6, 240; Thomas A. Durkin, 
Credit Cards: Use and Consumer Attitudes, 1970-2000, FED.  RESERVE  BULL., 
September 2000, at 625. 
47 See David I. Laibson et al., A Debt Puzzle, in KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION, AND 
EXPECTATIONS IN MODERN MACROECONOMICS: IN HONOR OF EDMUND S. PHELPS 
230 (Philippe Aghion et al. eds., 2003) (based on the 1995 Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF)). See also Gross & Souleles, supra note 42, at 151 (“About 2/3 of 
households have at least one bankcard”); Durkin, supra note 22, at 202 (72% of 
households held a bank card in 2001). 
48 See Statistical Abstract, supra note 1, tbls. 652, 1165 (for 2000 figures); EVANS & 
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 87 (for 1970 figures). 
49 See Lloyd Klein, IT’S IN THE CARDS: CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE 26 (1999) (“Credit cards facilitated the rise of consumer spending for 
consumer products or services.”); Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Differences in Consumer 
Purchase Behavior by Credit Card Payment System, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 58 (1979) 
(people who own more credit cards make larger purchases per department store 
visit); Richard A. Feinberg, Credit Cards as Spending Facilitating Stimuli: A 
Conditioning Interpretation, 12 J. CONSUMER RES. 384 (1986) (restaurant tips are 
larger when payment is by credit card); Drazen Prelec & Duncan Simester, Always 
Leave Home Without It: A Further Investigation of the Credit-Card Effect on 
Willingness to Pay, 12 MARKETING  LETTERS 5 (2001) (respondents offered 
significantly higher prices for Celtics and Red Sox tickets when paying by credit 
card). These studies preclude a liquidity constraints explanation for the credit card 
effect. See, e.g., id. at 10. 
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Not only do credit cards encourage spending, they encourage 
borrowing as well.
50  As noted by Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook:  
 
“Credit card debt has become as much a part of American 
life as has the credit card itself . . . . Of the three-quarters of 
all households that have at least one credit card, three out of 
four of them also carry credit card debt from month to 
month . . . . Increasingly, . . . [Americans] do not pay [with 
their credit cards] – they finance. Quietly, without much 
fanfare, Americans have taken to buying school shoes and 




Credit cards are now the leading source of unsecured consumer 
credit/debt.  Moreover, not only consumers use credit card financing: 
Many self-employed owners of small businesses turn to high-interest 
credit card debt to finance their businesses.
52  Total credit card 
borrowing amounted to about $683 billion in 2000.
53  The average 
credit card debt per household in the US amounted to over $6,500 in 
2000.
54  Restricting attention to the 80% of households with credit 
cards, average debt per household rises to over $8,000,
  and the 
average debt per indebted household is over $12,500.
55  Credit card 
debt has exhibited an extraordinary growth rate, gradually taking over 
the entire consumer debt category.  This growth in credit card debt 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., Gross & Souleles, supra note 42, at 151 (Of all households with at least 
one bankcard “at least 56 percent – a remarkably large fraction – are borrowing on 
their bankcards, that is, paying interest, not just transacting.”). These figures, which 
are based on SCF data, significantly understate the percentage of households with 
credit card debt, since SCF households substantially underreport their credit card 
debt. Id. at n. 2. 
51 S ULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 110-11. See also Klein, 
supra note 49, at 29 (“[t]he “me generation,” actualized through credit card 
utilization, was transformed into a debt carrying “greed generation” wanting and 
buying everything in sight.”) 
52  See S ULLIVAN,  WARREN  &  WESTBROOK,  supra note 2, at 115-7; EVANS  & 
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 34, 103-7. 
53 See supra note 2. Total consumer debt was $1560.6 billion in 2000. Id. See also 
CARD  INDUSTRY  DIRECTORY,  2003  EDITION 15 (Sandra L. Budde ed., 2002) 
(hereinafter “Card Industry Directory”) (In 2001, general purpose consumer credit 
outstanding reached $605 billion, out of $1667.4 billion of the total consumer 
lending). 
54 This figure is derived by dividing the total consumer credit card debt, $638 billion 
(see  supra note 53), by the number of households, 104,705,000 (see Statistical 
Abstract, supra note 1, tbl. 51). 
55 The fraction of households with at least one credit card that are borrowing on 
their credit cards is 63%. See Laibson et al., supra note 47, at 231. Focusing on 
bankcard debt, Gross & Souleles report that “[c]onditional on borrowing, the 
median bankcard account is borrowing over $2000, with about another $5000 of 
balances on other cards…. These are large magnitudes in the context of typical 
household balance sheets.” Gross & Souleles, supra note 42, at 151. 
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also accounts for the steady increase in the ratio of consumer debt to 
income.
56 
It is, therefore, not surprising that credit card debt plays a 
notoriously important role in consumer bankruptcy.  Credit card 
defaults are highly correlated with personal bankruptcies.
57  Based on 
their thorough empirical investigation of consumer bankruptcy filings, 
Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook conclude that:  “[a]s the fastest 
growing proportion of consumer debt, credit card debt has led the way 
to bankruptcy for an increasing number of Americans . . . .”
58  Careful 
statistical analysis undertaken by Ronald Mann in a recent study 




C.  The Credit Card Industry 
 
1.  Structure 
 
A first cut divides the credit card market into the major credit 
card brands, Visa, MasterCard, American Express and Discover. The 
bankcard brands, Visa and MasterCard, share a common and more 
complex structure. These are in fact joint ventures of banks, 
comprising thousands of distinct issuers.
60  While many of these 
bank-issuers operate only at the local level, a significant number of 
issuers participate at the regional and national levels.  In the 1990s a 
new group of players entered the credit card scene - the nonbank 
issuers, such as AT&T.  While formally these nonbank issuers are 
necessarily affiliated with a Visa or MasterCard issuing bank and the 
issued credit card is a co-brand card, e.g. of AT&T and MasterCard, 
the major strategic decisions are undertaken by the nonbank issuer.
61 
Focusing on the bankcard brands, it is interesting that the Visa 
and MasterCard associations are quite decentralized.  Lawrence 
Ausubel observed that “most relevant business decisions are made at 
the level of the issuing bank [rather than at the Visa or MasterCard 
                                                 
56  See  supra  note 2; SULLIVAN,  WARREN  &  WESTBROOK,  supra note 2, at 18 
(“[R]eal consumer debt has risen dramatically over a long period during which real 
incomes for many people have stayed the same or declined.”) 
57 See supra notes 2. But see Zywicki, supra note 13, at 82 (doubting the link 
between credit cards and bankruptcy rates).  Bankruptcy rates rose steadily until 
1998; they declined in 1999 and 2000, but rose again, set a new record high, in 
2001. See Card Industry Directory, supra note 53, at 38. 
58 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 129.  See also SULLIVAN, 
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 119-20; EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra 
note 13, at 5. 
59 Mann, supra note 40. 
60 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 4, 48. See also Ausubel, supra 
note 12, at 51 (there are more than four thousand card-issuing banks).  MasterCard 
recently registered as a private share corporation, owned by its member banks. See 
http://www.mastercardintl.com/corporate/corp_governance.html. 
61 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 49, 75-77. 
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organizations level].  Individual banks own their cardholders’ 
accounts and determine the interest rate, annual fee, grace period, 
credit limit, and other terms of the account.”
62 
Visa and MasterCard set only the interchange fee, the transfer 
from the merchant’s bank to the card-issuing bank, which does not 
seem to constitute a major source of revenue for the issuers.
63  In 
addition, the bankcard associations operate on a break-even basis, 
only covering their cost of operation, while the banks-issuers get all 
the profits.
64  Still the Visa and MasterCard organizations play an 
important role in making system-wide decisions, in promoting the 
association’s brand name, specifically through advertising, and in 




2.  Competition 
 
There are two intertwined levels of competition within the credit 
card industry.  At the upper level, the major credit card brands—
especially Visa, MasterCard, American Express and Discover—
compete among themselves.  Visa is the industry leader both in terms 
of charge volume and in terms of credit extended, with MasterCard 
following closely behind.  American Express and Discover occupy 
the more distant third and forth places, respectively.
66  The evidence 
regarding the intensity of competition at the network level is mixed.  
While the four brands are clearly competing against each other, the 
series of antitrust challenges against Visa and MasterCard suggests 
that the leading brands have taken steps to limit competition at the 
network level.
67  
                                                 
62 Ausubel, supra note 12, at 51. 
63 Id. See also EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 199. 
64 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 197. 
65 See infra. The role played by the associations in terms of investment in product 
development and brand recognition is the subject of serious debate between the 
larger and smaller issuers.  While the small issuers would like the associations to 
invest more, the large issuers view such investments as competing with their private 
brand and product development. 
66 See Card Industry Directory, supra note 53, at 14-15 (In 2001, the U.S. credit 
card market was divided among these issuers as follows: Visa – 44.5 percent with 
$591.9 billion in charge volume, MasterCard – 31.6 percent with $421 billion in 
charge volume, American Express – 16.9 percent with $224.5 billion in charge 
volume, and Discover – 7 percent with $93.3 billion in charge volume.  Focusing on 
credit extended by the four major brands, the 2001 market shares were: Visa – 45.3 
percent with $274 billion of outstanding credit, MasterCard – 41.3 percent with 
$249.7 billion of outstanding credit, Discover – 8.1 percent with $49.3 billion of 
outstanding credit, and American Express – 5.3 percent with $32 billion of 
outstanding credit.) 
67 In particular, the Second Circuit recently struck down Visa and MasterCard 
bylaws that prevented member banks from issuing American Express and Discover 
cards. See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2
nd Cir. 2003). For a 
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While competition at the network level might be less than perfect, 
it is difficult to deny the intensity of competition at the issuing level, 
where thousands of banks, as well as American Express and Discover 
(as issuers) compete for consumers.
68  Beyond the sheer number of 
competitors, the conclusion that competition in the issuing market is 
robust is supported by evidence regarding the ease of entry into this 
market,
69 the low level of concentration in the market,
70  t h e  
availability of information that facilitates comparison among the 
many different card issuers,
71 and the arguably small cost of switching 
from one card/issuer to another.
72  
Despite the evidence of competition in the industry, some 
commentators, relying on evidence of high interest rates exceeding 
the issuers’ cost of funds, have argued that high supra-competitive 
profits exist in the credit card industry, indicating imperfect 
competition.
73 
                                                                                                                  
summary of the different antitrust challenges faced by Visa and MasterCard over 
the years—see EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, ch. 11. 
68 Indeed, the Second Circuit specifically noted that “competition . . . is robust at the 
issuing level.” See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 240 (2
nd Cir. 
2003). Commentators observe that the bankcard associations do not facilitate 
collusion among the member banks. See, e.g., Ausubel, supra note 12, at 51. It is 
noteworthy that many of the issuers distribute their cards nationally or regionally. 
See Federal Reserve, Survey of Credit Card Plans (July 31
st, 2003) 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/shop/tablwb.pdf).  While competition on the 
issuer-consumer side of the credit card market seems quite robust, the evidence 
regarding the intensity of competition on the merchant side of the market is less 
conclusive.  On the one hand, Evans and Schmalensee document evidence of 
competition on the merchant discount dimension (the fee that merchants pay per 
credit card transaction).  See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 129, 206. 
On the other hand, in a recent class action antitrust suit against Visa and MasterCard 
merchants successfully challenged Visa and MasterCard’s tying of credit and debit 
services with their so-called honor-all-cards rules.  See  In re Visa 
Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22898 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 
19, 2003) (the district court approved a settlement requiring Visa and MasterCard to 
abandon their honor-all-cards rules). 
69 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 228-233.  The steady increase in 
the number of issuers provides further support for the claim that entry into this 
market is easy.  Id. 
70 Id. at 226-9.  This relatively low level of concentration persists despite a series of 
recent mergers in the credit card industry.  See Card Industry Directory, supra note 
53, at 13, 45. 
71  See Survey of Credit Card Plans, supra note 68. See also E VANS  & 
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 233 (“Newspapers publish lists of low-rate cards, 
and since 1990 the Federal Reserve has published a survey of credit card plans for 
about 150 issuers.”). 
72 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 234-5. Still, the existing switching 
cost may hinder competition. See infra Sections II.A.3 and III.B.3. 
73 See Ausubel, supra note 1212, at 50, 56, 64 (Based on data from the 1980s and 
early 1990s, Lawrence Ausubel found that “the credit card business earned 3-5 
times the ordinary rate of return in the banking industry.”); SULLIVAN, WARREN & 
WESTBROOK, supra note 22, at 135-36 (arguing that “[i]nterest drives profitability,” 
and describing the high profits of credit card issuers); FDIC QUARTERLY BANKING 
PROFILE, 4
th Quarter, 2002, at 2 (at year-end 2002 credit card issuers continue to 
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In what follows I show that the central failure in the credit card 
market—consumers’ underestimation of their future borrowing—
leads to inefficiencies that cannot be cured even by perfect 
competition.  Therefore, there is reason to place the credit card 
industry under scrutiny even if it is subject to intense competition that 
dissipates any supra-competitive rents.  
 
II.  CREDIT CARD PRICING 
 
Credit card pricing patterns are indicative of a behavioral market 
failure.  In this Section, I describe the relevant features of credit card 
pricing.
74  In the following Section, I develop a behavioral theory that 
can explain the observed pricing scheme. 
 
A.  Disaggregating the Credit Card Price 
 
1.  High Interest Rates 
 
A central element of credit card pricing is the interest rate 
charged on credit card debt.  Credit card contracts set high interest 
rates. The average credit card interest rate was 16.44 percent in 
2003.
75  In fact, “[c]redit cards are the most expensive form of debt 
available.”
76  In the early 1990s, evidence of high and sticky interest 
rates led to the introduction of several bills to cap credit card interest 
rates in the United States Congress and several state legislatures.
77 
These high interest rates, are even more surprising when 
compared to the costs faced by credit card issuers. The evidence 
                                                                                                                  
lead the banking industry in profitability, registering an average return-on-assets of 
3.69 percent – three times the industry average). 
74 I focus on pricing on the consumer side of the credit card market. It should be 
noted, however, that the credit card market—being a two-sided network market—
exhibits interesting pricing patterns also on the merchant side of the market and 
between the two sides of the market (namely, the interchange fee that acquierers pay 
to issuers). For a recent survey of the literature that studies these other aspects of 
credit card pricing—see Sujit Chakravorti, Theory of Credit card Networks: A 
Survey of the Literature, 2 REV. NETWORK ECON. 50 (2003). 
75 See www.CardWeb.com/cardtrak/news/2004/january/29a.html. See also Laibson 
et al., supra note 47, at 228-29 (The average interest rate paid on credit card debt 
“has been approximately 16% in the last five years, implying a real interest rate of 
14%.”  This is a debt-weighted interest rate that includes teaser rates.); Gross & 
Souleles, supra note 42, at 153, 179; Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Consumer 
Credit (Feb. 2003) (In 2002 and 2003 the average credit card interest rate charged 
by commercial banks and finance companies was between 13.13 percent and 13.65 
percent.) 
76 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 117. See also EVANS & 
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 248 (“Credit card interest rates are usually higher 
than the interest rates on many other types of consumer loans.”)  But see Zywicki, 
supra note 13, at 100 (arguing that “[c]ompared to realistic and comparable 
alternatives, credit card interest rates do not appear to be high”). 
77 See supra note 3. 
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suggests that prices in the credit card market significantly exceed 
costs, and that credit card interest rates are not responsive to cost 
declines.
78  
Some have tried to justify the high credit card interest rates as a 
response to the high default rates that issuers face (which can be 
viewed as another cost element).
79  However, as Sullivan, Warren & 
Westbrook observe, “there is no evidence that consumer interest rates 
have risen and fallen with the rates of defaulted consumer debts, so 
there is no basis to think that fewer defaults would produce lower 
interest rates for the rest of us.”
80  Moreover, even accounting for 
default rates, which measure the risk involved in credit card lending, 
and adding the risk premium to the issuers’ cost of funds, credit card 
interest rates seem quite high.  In particular, in 2003 the cost of funds 
for a financial institution was approximately 2%.
81  Dividing by one 
minus the default rate, as measured by the average charge-off rate of 
7.28%,
82 yields a risk-adjusted interest rate of 10%, which is 
significantly lower than the average credit card interest rate of 
16.44%.
83 Finally, evidence of 18% premiums on the resale of credit 
card debt proves that credit card interest rates substantially exceed the 
risk adjusted marginal cost of funds.
84  
It has been argued that high credit card interest rates are needed 
to cover other cost elements, specifically the cost of building a viable 
credit card portfolio, operating expenses (e.g. rent and salaries) and 
the cost of services other than lending that the card provides.
85  But 
while these fixed costs—or, at least, costs that are fixed with respect 
to lending—can explain above marginal cost pricing, they cannot 
                                                 
78 See Ausubel, supra note 27, at 261 (“Throughout the remainder of the 1980s, 
credit card interest rates displayed a profound unresponsiveness to changes in the 
cost of funds.”); EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 248 (“Not only are 
credit card interest rates high, they do not always move as quickly as other interest 
rates in response to changes in the cost of the funds that banks raise to support their 
lending activities.”) Evans & Schmalensee argue that the increase in variable-rate 
plans in the 1990s represents greater responsiveness to changes in the cost of funds. 
Id. at 251. 
79 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 249-50 (“[Credit card loans] are 
riskier than other consumer loans and require a higher interest rate to compensate 
for this higher risk.”) Issuers’ costs break down to 40% costs of funds and 32% 
charge-offs/fraud. Id. at 214-15. 
80 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 255. 
81 Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Selected Interest Rates (Sept. 5, 2003). 
82  See www.CardWeb.com/cardtrak/news/2004/january/29a.html. In fact, the 
charge-off rate overestimates issuers’ risk, since issuers manage to recover some of 
the debt that is initially charged-off.  
83 Id. 
84  See  Card Industry Directory, supra note 53, at 39 (Reporting an average 
premiums in excess of 18 percent on acquisitions of credit card portfolios in 2000 
and 2001). The concept of a premium in a sale of a credit card portfolio is explained 
in Ausubel, supra note 12, at 65. 
85 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 249-50, 254-55. See also Zywicki, 
supra note 13, at 120 (operating costs, rather than the cost of funds, are the main 
component of issuers’ costs.) 
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explain why, of all possible dimensions of the credit card price, 
issuers choose to use high interest rates to cover their fixed costs.  In 
particular, why not use annual rates or per-transaction fees? 
Viewed in isolation from other elements of the credit card price, 
the high interest rates charged on credit card debt are quite puzzling.  
Such above-marginal-cost pricing is inconsistent with the seemingly 
intense competition in the credit card industry.
86  As a result, some 
commentators have concluded that in fact there is very little 
competition on this important dimension of credit card pricing.
87  As I 
demonstrate below, high interest rates that exceed the marginal cost of 
funds, while implying limited competition on the interest rate 
dimension, are nevertheless consistent with intense competition in the 
credit card market.
88 
Perhaps the true puzzle surrounding credit card interest rates is 
rooted in the demand side of the market.  Given these high interest 
rates, the extent of credit card debt is quite surprising.  Why would a 
rational consumer choose “the most expensive form of debt 
available”?
89  A preliminary response might be that these consumers 
have no access to less-expensive sources of funds.
90  But this response 
is not supported by the evidence. In fact, ninety-five percent of 
consumers that carry credit card balances have access to cheaper 
sources of financing.
91  
                                                 
86 See Ausubel, supra note 27, at 261-62 (“The economic puzzle surrounding the 
credit card market of the 1980s was why competition among the more than four 
thousand card-issuing banks did not lead credit card interest rates to follow 
decreases in the cost of funds.”). 
87 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 254-55 (“For reasons that 
are not entirely clear, the consumer credit market is not very competitive as to 
interest rates….”). This view, however, is not uncontested. Evans and Schamlensee 
argue that there is evidence of price competition in the credit card industry. See 
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 238-39. See also Glenn B. Canner & 
Charles A. Luckett, Developments in the Pricing of Credit Card Services, 78 FED. 
RESERVE  BULL. 652 (1992) (finding some competition based on interest rate 
reduction). 
88 See infra Section III. 
89 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 117. 
90 See Zywicki, supra note 13, at 95-96 (many consumers do not have superior 
borrowing alternatives). 
91 Gross & Souleles, supra note 42, at 180 (“Conditional on borrowing on their 
bankcards, 95 percent of households have positive net worth and so could have paid 
some of their expensive credit card debt by drawing down various assets. For 
instance, almost 70 percent have positive housing equity, and so would be better off 
using lower cost home-equity debt (currently charging around 7-9 percent, not 
including tax deductions). Over 90 percent have positive holdings of financial 
assets, even excluding illiquid, tax-favored retirement assets. Most puzzling of all, 
over 90 percent of people with credit card debt have some very liquid assets in 
checking and savings accounts, which usually yield at most 1-2 percent…. [And 
about 1/3 of households with credit card debt] have over one month’s income in 
liquid assets [even for high-income and high-education households].”); EVANS & 
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 107-08 (“Most consumers who finance purchases 
with credit card loans could find a cheaper source of financing. They are probably 
earning a lower rate of return on their savings—even, in most years, if it is invested 




2.  No Annual or Per-Transaction Fees 
  
Another dimension of credit card pricing is the annual fee.  But 
while most card issuers used to charge annual fees for their cards, it is 
now common for issuers to charge no annual fee.
92  In comparison, 
charge cards, such as the American Express Green card, do charge 
substantial annual fees.
93  
It is also noteworthy that credit card pricing does not include any 
per-transaction fee.
94  In fact, when considering the benefits or 
rewards programs associated with most credit cards, issuers are 
setting  negative per-transaction fees.  The proliferation of 
membership-rewards programs, frequent flyer miles, car rental and 
luggage insurance, discounts on future purchases and cash-back 
grants demonstrates the competitive forces at play on this dimension 
of the credit card contract.
95 
Even though they incur positive costs in maintaining credit card 
accounts and processing transactions, issuers commonly set a zero (or 
even a negative) price for these services. These observations suggest 
that issuers are charging below-marginal-cost prices on the annual fee 
and per-transaction fee dimensions of the credit card contract.
96 
 
                                                                                                                  
in the stock market—than the interest rate they are paying on their credit card debt. 
They could also probably obtain cheaper loans by obtaining a personal loan from 
their bank or, even better, a home equity loan.”) 
92 In 1990 only about 150 issuers, out of over 4,000 issuers (see Ausubel, supra note 
12, at 50), offered no-fee cards. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 159. 
Now, no-fee cards are common. See Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, 
Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence, 119 QUAR. J. ECON. __, 
tbl. 3, col. 3 (2004). See  also E VANS  &  SCHMALENSEE,  supra note 13, at 27 
(Citibank Visa card, one of the most widely used credit cards, sets a zero annual 
fee); https://www.citibank.com/us/cards/index.jsp (Currently Citibank offers several 
MasterCard credit cards with no annual fee.) 
93 See DellaVigna & Malmendier, supra note 92, n. 14 (“the American Express 
charge card, the most common in the US, has an annual fee of $55 or $75 (if 
Gold).”). See also EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 27. 
94 When merchants, in response to fees levied (directly or indirectly) by issuers, 
charge higher prices for credit card purchases, this price differential constitutes a de 
facto per-transaction fee for credit card transactions. Charging different prices as a 
function of the payment method is, however, quite rare (and in most jurisdictions 
either illegal or effectively prevented by card networks’ no discrimination rules). 
See, e.g., Chakravorti, supra note 74, at 55-56. 
95 Evans & Schmalensee cite survey evidence suggesting that 20% of consumers 
consider rewards and rebates to be the prime selection criterion in their credit card 
choice. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 225. 
96 See Chakravorti, supra note 74, at 52 (noting the below marginal cost pricing 
implied by the absence of per-transaction fees).  This does not necessarily imply 
that issuers are losing money on the transacting component of the card product. The 
question is whether merchant fees (passed on to issuers via the interchange fee in 
the Visa and MasterCard systems) are sufficiently high to cover the cost of the 
transacting services. Unfortunately, the poor data available on the costs of different 
payment systems, does not allow for a conclusive answer.  
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3.  Teaser Rates 
 
In the last few years it has become common for credit card issuers 
to offer low introductory rates – often called teaser rates – typically 
for a period of six months, before the high long-term interest rate 
kicks in.  Some cards even offer a zero interest rate during the 
introductory period (also a zero interest rate on balance transfers is 
common).
97  
The invention of teaser rates would surely be beneficial for 
consumers if consumers would transfer their balance to a new card 
with a low teaser rate as soon as the old card reverted to the high post-
introductory rate.  While balance transfers do occur, available 
evidence suggests that substantial borrowing occurs at the post-
introductory rates.  In fact, a recent study found that most borrowing 
is done at the high post-promotion rates, rather than at the low teaser 
rates.
98 
The teaser strategy works.  Despite the fact that most borrowing 
is done at the high post-promotion rates, consumers appear to be 
extremely sensitive to teaser rates.  In a recent study, Ausubel found 
that “consumers are at least three times as responsive to changes in 
the introductory interest rate as compared to dollar-equivalent 
changes in the post-introductory interest rate.”
99  Survey evidence 
suggests that more than a third of all consumers consider an attractive 
introductory interest rate to be the prime selection criterion in credit 
card choice.
100  Moreover, Gross and Soulelels found that “[t]he 
elasticity [of debt to the interest rate] is larger for decreases in interest 
rates than for increases.”
101  This finding further bolsters the efficacy 
of the teaser rate as a profit-maximizing strategy for credit card 
issuers.
102 
Teaser rates emphasize the disparity between credit card interest 
rates and the underlying cost of funds.  Usually, the issuers’ costs do 
not increase over time, and they definitely do not suddenly double 
after six months.  The low, and even below-marginal-cost teaser rates, 
                                                 
97 See DellaVigna & Malmendier, supra note 92, tbl. 3; Ausubel, supra note 27, at 
262. 
98 See Gross & Souleles, supra note 42, at 171, 179. See also Ausubel, supra note 
27, at 263 (“a substantial portion of credit card borrowing still occurs at 
postintroductory interest rates”; “finance charges paid to credit card issuers have not 
dropped as much as the introductory offers might suggest.”); Laibson et al., supra 
note 47, at 228-29 (finding that consumers pay high effective interest rates 
“[d]espite the rise of teaser interest rates”). 
99 Lawrence M. Ausubel, Adverse Selection in the Credit Card Market 21 (1999) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Moreover, “consumers are two to 
three times as responsive to changes in the introductory interest rate as compared to 
dollar-equivalent changes in the duration of the introductory offer.” Id. at 22. 
100 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 225. 
101 See Gross & Souleles, supra note 42, at 152. 
102 Cf. H.R. 975, 108
th Cong., § 1303 (2003) (Concerned with the prevalence and 
impact of introductory rates, Congress is currently considering to enhance the 
disclosure requirements for teaser rates). 
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while perhaps puzzling when viewed in isolation, fit well within the 
behavioral theory of credit card pricing developed below. 
 
4.  Late and Over-Limit Fees 
 
Credit card issuers typically collect sizeable fees and increased 
interest rates from consumers who either run late on their monthly 
payments, or run over the credit limit.
103  
 Importantly, the magnitude 
of these penalties is often measured in fixed dollar amounts, typically 
around $30, regardless of the degree of deviation from the credit line 
or tardiness in making the payment.
104  Thus, for example, a 
cardholder might pay a $30 penalty, if she misses the due date on a 
$10 balance by a few days.  
Late fees and over-limit fees are a major source of revenue for 
credit card issuers, nearly 8 percent of total card revenues.
105  “Many 
credit card issuers respond to a customer who is exceeding his or her 
credit limit by charging a fee – and raising the credit limit.  The 
practice of charging default rates of interest, which often run into the 
20 and 30 percent range, makes customers who give the clearest sign 
of trouble – missing payments – among the most profitable for the 
                                                 
103  See  DellaVigna & Malmendier, supra note 92,  at  27, tbl. 3; EVANS  & 
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 27, 141-43 (a card-holder who is tardy on her 
payments is often subject to increased interest rates); SULLIVAN,  WARREN  & 
WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 19 (“Many creditors now impose a “default” rate on 
interest on the consumers who fall behind, compounding the balance owed at rates 
of 24 percent and higher.”); http://www.citibank.com/us/cards (Citibank’s basic 
credit card, Citi Platinum Select Card, sets a default interest rate of 27.99%, as 
compared to the non-default APR 9.99%). 
104 See DellaVigna & Malmendier, supra note 92, tbl. 3, cols. 7, 8. See also Pfennig 
v. Household Credit Services, Inc., No. 00-4213 (6
th Cir., July 2, 2002) ($29 over-
limit charge for every month the balance remained over the credit limit, regardless 
of the degree of deviation from the credit limit); SULLIVAN,  WARREN  & 
WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 23 (“penalty fees added on at $50 a pop”); Bob 
Herbert, Caught in the Credit Card Vise, nytimes.com, Sept. 22, 2003 (late fees 
average $29); http://www.citibank.com/us/cards (Citibank’s basic credit card, Citi 
Platinum Select Card, sets fixed late and over-limit fees of $35). 
105 See Card Industry Directory, supra note 5327, at 11 (In 2001, revenues from 
penalty fees amounted to $7.3 billion, out of a total $92.5 billion of bank card 
revenues).  See also NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, TRUTH IN LENDING 27 
(2002 Cumulative Supplement) (“Over-limit fees are a major source of revenue for 
many credit card issuers.”); Herbert, supra note 104 104(late fees are the fastest 
growing source of revenue for the credit card industry).  Penalty fees have been 
growing rapidly since 1996 when the Supreme Court extended the Marquette rule to 
include late and over-limit fees. See Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996).  See 
also Tamara Draut & Javier Silva, Borrowing to Make Ends Meet: The Growth of 
Credit Card Debt in the ‘90s, p. 35 (Dēmos, 2003) (hereinafter “Dēmos”) (Late fees 
are the fastest growing source of revenues for issuers). 




106  Issuers have also been shortening grace periods to further 
enhance revenues from penalty fees.
107 
The high fees that issuers charge for late payments and for 
exceeding the credit limit have no basis in the extra cost to issuers of 
extending the loan period or increasing the amount loaned, even 
accounting for the potentially heightened risk of accommodating a 
consumer who failed to pay on time or to remain within the specified 
credit line.  This disparity between price and cost is especially striking 
when the late and over-limit fees are set at fixed dollar amounts, 
irrespective of the tardiness of the payment or the magnitude of the 
deviation from the credit limit.  
 
5.  Low Minimum Monthly Payments 
 
Credit card issuers often require only a very small minimum monthly 
payment, even for large outstanding balances.
108  On its face it would 
seem that this strategy benefits consumers; but does it really?  In fact, 
it is in the financial interest of credit card issuers that consumers pay 
as little as possible each month.  Lower monthly payments “increase 
total revenues by increasing the time it takes to repay the loans and 
hence the total interest eventually repaid,”
109 especially when interest 
rates are set so high.  It is therefore not surprising that issuers have 
been gradually lowering the minimum payment requirement.
110 
 
B.  A Unifying Pattern 
 
The identified components of observed credit card pricing can be 
broadly divided into two categories: a long-term contingent price 
category and a short-term non-contingent price category.  The post-
introductory interest rate is the main long-term contingent element, 
with low amortization rates bolstering the effect of the high interest 
rate.  Penalties for late payments and for deviations from the credit 
line limit also figure prominently in this category.  On the other hand, 
annual rates are the most salient non-contingent element. I classify 
                                                 
106  SULLIVAN,  WARREN  &  WESTBROOK,  supra note 2, at 115. See also D ēmos, 
supra note 105, at 35 (Late payment as an excuse to cancel low introductory rates 
and to impose high(!) penalty rates). 
107 See Dēmos, supra note 105, at 35; Credit Card Fees Soar Again, CNNMoney, 
August 18, 1998. See also Pfennig v. Household Credit Services, Inc., No. 00-4213 
(6
th Cir., July 2, 2002). Cf. H.R. 975, 108
th Cong., § 1305 (2003) (Concerned with 
the problem of late fees, Congress is currently considering to enhance the disclosure 
requirements for such fees). 
108 Moreover, “major credit card issuers are slowly lowering their minimum 
monthly payments.” Teresa Dixon Murray, Small Payment Is a Big Problem: 
Struggling Out of Credit Card Debt, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 11, 2002, at Business, 
p. 5. And “[p]aying the minimum is a common phenomenon.” Id. 
109 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 247-48. 
110 See Dēmos, supra note 105, at 37. 
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per-transaction fees also in the non-contingent price category, since 
the focus is on the borrowing contingency and not on the transacting 
contingency.  Teaser rates are a short-term price element, but they are 
nevertheless contingent on borrowing.  Since, as I demonstrate below, 
the operative behavioral bias is less severe in the short run, it is 
helpful to classify teaser rates as a short-term non-contingent price 
element. 
This classification reveals the unifying pattern of credit card 
pricing: over-pricing of long-term contingent price elements and 
under-pricing of short-term non-contingent price elements.  The long-
term elements, most importantly the (long-term) interest rate, but also 
late and over-limit fees, are set above marginal cost.  And the short-
term elements, namely annual and per-transaction fees, as well as 
teaser rates, are set below marginal cost. 
 
III.  A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF CREDIT CARD PRICING 
 
A.  Underestimating Future Borrowing 
 
The distinct pricing scheme characterized in Section II can be 
traced to a behavioral bias on the demand side of the credit card 
market—to consumers’ systematic underestimation of their future 
borrowing.
111  Before elaborating how this behavioral theory explains 
credit card pricing, I first explore the underlying foundations of the 
underestimation bias. 
 
1.  Underestimation of Self-Control Problems 
 
Imperfect self-control provides one major explanation for 
consumers’ underestimation of their future borrowing.  Many 
consumers overestimate their ability to resist the temptation to finance 
consumption by borrowing, and consequently underestimate future 
borrowing. 
 
a)  Imperfect Self-Control 
 
What happened before credit cards?  The consumer could apply 
for a bank loan equal to her credit card balance.  But would she? 
Juxtaposing the traditional bank loan and the incremental credit 
card loan reveals the critical role of self-control (or lack thereof).   
                                                 
111 See Ausubel, supra note 12, at 70-1 (“[T]here are consumers who do not intend 
to borrow but continuously do so.”) In a recent study, Ausubel empirically tests and 
confirms the “underestimation hypothesis”.  See Ausubel, supra note 99, at 20. But 
see Thomas F. Cargill & Jeanne Wendel, Bank Credit Cards: Consumer 
Irrationality versus Market Forces, 30 J. CONSUMER AFF. 373, 386 (1996) (SCF 
evidence suggests that consumers anticipate future borrowing). 
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When a consumer takes-on a close-end loan all the parameters of the 
loan contract, including the amount of the loan, are determined up-
front.  No discretion is reserved for a later period, and thus self-
control is not an issue.  The credit card, on the other hand, separates 
the decision to obtain a card, and the decision which card to obtain, 
from the actual borrowing decision (or decisions).  The amount of the 
loan is left open.  And an open-end loan inevitably also opens the 
door to self-control problems.  
When obtaining a credit card the consumer may intend to use the 
card for transacting only, or to limit her borrowing to a certain 
amount.  But this limit is not specified in the credit card contract, and 
therefore is not binding on the consumer’s future self, the self that 
will make the borrowing decision.  And with imperfect self-control, 
this future self may well exceed the intended limit.  A close-end loan 
serves as a commitment device—enabling the consumer to constrain 
her future self by pre-committing to a maximum amount of debt.  The 
credit card does not provide such a commitment device.
112   
 
b)  Hyperbolic Discounting 
 
 Why would a consumer end up borrowing more than she had 
initially anticipated?  What is the source of such weakness of the will? 
Hyperbolic discounting provides the answer.
113 
A consumer is said to be a hyperbolic discounter if her short-run 
discount rate is larger than her long-run discount rate.
114  P u t  
differently, at a given point in time, t, a hyperbolic discounter heavily 
discounts costs and benefits that will materialize in the near future, at 
                                                 
112 Many accounts of credit card borrowing mention consumers’ weakness of will, 
or imperfect self-control. The notion is that consumers do not intend to borrow, but 
end up doing so anyway. See, e.g., Ausubel, supra note 27, at 262. The credit card 
borrower is sometimes compared to an alcoholic, who is aware of the dangers 
inherent in her drinking problem, yet cannot avoid purchasing another bottle. 
Another common analogy compares the credit card borrower to a failed dieter. The 
dieter wants to lose weight, but when that chocolate cake presents itself, he cannot 
resist the temptation. The alcoholism and dieting analogies highlight the self-control 
problem. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 120, 247, 250. 
113 In a recent study, Laibson et. al. show that allowing for hyperbolic discounting 
helps explain the large fraction of households that borrow on their credit cards. See 
Laibson et al., supra note 47, at 229-30. See also George-Marios Angeletos et al., 
The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical 
Evaluation, 15 J.  ECON.  PERSPECT. 47 (2001) (“[H]ouseholds with hyperbolic 
discount functions are very likely to borrow on their credit cards to fund instant 
gratification. Thus households with hyperbolic discount functions are likely to have 
a high level of revolving debt, despite the high cost of credit card borrowing.”); 
DellaVigna & Malmendier, supra note 92 passim. 
114 Neoclassical economics traditionally assumes that individuals discount the future 
at a constant rate, an assumption captured by an exponential discount function. See, 
e.g., Paul Samuelson, A Note on Measurement of Utility, 4 REV. ECON. STUD.  155 
(1937); Tjalling C. Koopmans, Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impatience, 28 
ECONOMETRICA 287 (1960). 
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t+1, but assigns only a smaller additional discount for costs (and 
benefits) that will materialize in the more distant future, at t+2.  This 
systematic disparity between people’s short-term and long-term 
discount rates has been consistently demonstrated both in the 
laboratory and in real-world settings.
115  When a hyperbolic 
discounter is naïve about the nature of her time preferences, she will 
overestimate her will-power, and consequently underestimate her 
future borrowing. 
Consider a consumer who decides to obtain a credit card at T=0.  
From the T=0 perspective, this consumer considers the likelihood of 
borrowing on the credit card at T=1.  The consumer weighs the future 
benefit from a credit card purchase at T=1 against the more distant 
T=2 cost of debt repayment, including payment of interest charges.
116  
Recall that from the T=0 perspective the discount between T=1 and 
T=2 is relatively small.  Hence, given the substantial costs of credit 
card borrowing, even though the costs of borrowing lie in the more 
distant future, at T=0 the consumer would prefer not to borrow at 
T=1.  And assuming she thinks that this ex ante preference will be 
followed, at T=0 the consumer believes that no borrowing will take 
place at T=1. 
To examine the validity of this belief, let us proceed down the 
time-line to T=1, when the actual borrowing decision takes place.   
Now T=1 is the present and T=2 is the near future. As explained 
above, hyperbolic discounting implies that from the T=1 perspective 
the T=2 costs will be heavily discounted.  Therefore, even if the 
future (T=2) cost of borrowing is substantially higher than the present 
(T=1) benefits, the consumer, at T=1, may decide to borrow on her 
credit card. 
                                                 
115 For experimental evidence supporting the hyperbolic discounting model - see, 
e.g., Richard H. Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 
ECON. LETTERS 201, 202 (1981) (one of the first experiments); Shane Frederick et 
al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 
351, 360 (2002) (a recent survey). Outside the laboratory, hyperbolic discounting is 
evident in: consumption decisions – see T HALER,  supra  note 8, at 94, 105; 
insufficient saving for retirement – see Madrian & Shea, supra note 11, at 1150; 
Laibson et al., supra note 11, at 91; O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 11, at 125; 
addiction, whether to cigarettes, alcohol, or more serious drugs – see George 
Ainslie, Derivation of “Rational” Economic Behavior from Hyperbolic Discount 
Curves, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 334 (1991); Jonathan Gruber & Botond Koszegi, Is 
Addiction ‘Rational’? Theory and Evidence, NBER  WORKING  PAPER No. 7507 
(2000); dieting – see THALER, supra note 8, at 98; and health club attendance – see 
DellaVigna & Malmendier, supra note 9. 
116 Other indirect, yet potentially substantial costs of credit card borrowing, include 
(a) the cost of later resorting to borrowing with higher interest rates, when the 
indebtedness caused by borrowing on a credit card with more favorable financing 
terms (and the resulting decline in the consumer’s credit rating) leads the consumer 
to later obtain credit cards with less favorable financing terms; and (b) the increased 
probability of bankruptcy and all the collateral costs associated with it. See Amanda 
E. Dawsey & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Informal Bankruptcy (2002) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
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This preference reversal – a T=0 preference not to borrow 
evolving into a preference and a decision to borrow at T=1 – is an 
immediate implication of hyperbolic discounting.  Figure 1 illustrates 
the reversal of preferences with respect to credit card borrowing. 
The vertical line at T=1 represents the T=1 value of the benefits 
from borrowing.  The curved line descending from this vertical line 
(to the left) represents the discounted value of these benefits at any 
point in time prior to T=1, and especially at T=0.  Similarly, the 
vertical line at T=2 represents the T=2 value of the costs associated 
with credit card borrowing.  And the curved line descending from this 
vertical line (to the left) represents the discounted value of these costs 
at any point in time prior to T=2, and especially at T=1 and at T=0.  
As illustrated in figure 1, the two curved lines start with a steep 
descent, which then levels off as the temporal distance from the 
curve’s point of origin increases.  This varying slope of the 






















Looking at figure 1 we see that at T=0 the curve representing the 
discounted present value of the costs of borrowing lies above the 
curve representing the discounted present value of the benefits from 
borrowing.  Hence, at T=0 the consumer would prefer not to borrow 
(at T=1).  However, between T=0 and T=1 the relative position of the 
two curves switches, and at T=1 the benefits curve lies above the 
costs curve, implying that the consumer will in fact choose to borrow 
at T=1. 
2  1 
T 
0 






http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art12  SEDUCTION BY PLASTIC 28 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the temporal inconsistency resulting from 
hyperbolic discounting.  At T=0 the consumer does not wish to 
borrow, but ends up doing so at T=1 anyway.  Note, however, that 
temporally inconsistent preferences do not necessarily entail 
inaccurate ex ante beliefs.  A sophisticated consumer, who is aware of 
her hyperbolic discounting, would anticipate the preference reversal.  
At T=0, such a consumer, while preferring not borrow at T=1, would 
nevertheless know that she will end up borrowing at   
T=1.  Unfortunately, not many consumers are that sophisticated with 
respect to their inter-temporal preferences.  Many consumers are (at 
least partially) naïve, at T=0, about their ability to effectuate, at T=1, 
their T=0 preferences (i.e. they might fail to take into account the T=1 
preference reversal when making the T=0 decision).
117  A  n a ï v e  
hyperbolic discounter thus believes ex ante that she will not borrow, 
but actually does borrow on her credit card ex post.  More generally 
the hyperbolic discounter underestimates her future borrowing. 
 
c)  Borrowing a Little at a Time 
 
Imperfect self-control leading to the underestimation of future 
borrowing has been traced back to the temporal separation between 
the decision to obtain a credit card and the decision to borrow on the 
credit card.  But, in fact, there is not one, but rather many borrowing 
decisions.  Each time the consumer swipes her card a new loan is 
entered-into.  This piecemeal borrowing phenomenon, or “a-little-at-
a-time borrowing,” exacerbates the self-control problem.
118 
Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook observe that “[d]ebtors who never 
dream of seeking a $5,000 bank loan might run up $5,000 in charges 
of $50 at a time.”
119  The distinction between the traditional discrete 
loan and the gradually accumulating credit card debt should not be 
underestimated: “One need not have a deep understanding of human 
nature to appreciate the risks of incremental foolishness.  There are 
                                                 
117 See, e.g., Madrian and Shea, supra note 11 (evidence from 401(k) investments); 
DellaVigna & Malmendier, supra note 9 (evidence from health club attendance). 
Naivety may result from overconfidence regarding one’s self-control—a 
manifestation of the well-documented optimism about positive personal traits. See, 
e.g., Laurie Larwood & William Whittaker, Managerial Myopia: Self-Serving 
Biases in Organizational Planning, 62 J.  APPLIED  PSYCH. 194 (1977); Neil D. 
Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY AND 
SOC. PSYCH. 806 (1980); Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful 
than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143 (1981). 
118 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 130 (“[C]redit cards 
make it far easier to incur consumer debt by encouraging a-little-at-a-time 
borrowing and too-little-at-a-time repayment.”) 
119 TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & LAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS 
WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 
178 (1989). 
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many mistakes we would not make all at once that we will make a 
little at a time . . . .”
120 
As fallible decision-makers, we inevitably make mistakes. But we 
will try harder to avoid such mistakes—and rationally so—when the 
stakes are higher (or appear to be higher).  This general observation is 
applicable to the decision whether to incur additional debt:
121 “The 
debt itself is incurred a little bit at a time, so that even large amounts 
of debt do not involve a single, sober decision to take on $25,000 or 
even $2,500 of debt.”
 122 
Credits cards opened the door to “the seductiveness of 
incremental irresponsibility,”
123 as manifested in a-little-at-a-time 
borrowing.
124  The outcome of such borrowing behavior is often 
detrimental to consumers.  Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook describe a 
category of debtors, whom they call “sliders”: “[m]any people slide 
into debt, falling a little farther behind on their cards every month 
until bankruptcy is the only way out.”
125  
 
2.  Underestimation of Contingencies Bearing Economic Hardship 
 
Underestimation of future borrowing may also result from an 
optimism bias that might lead consumers to underestimate the 
likelihood of contingencies bearing economic hardship.
126  
Specifically, consumers might underestimate the likelihood of adverse 
events that might generate a need to borrow.  Optimistic individuals 
tend to underestimate the probability of being involved in an accident 
that might generate high medical bills or other liquidity needs.   
Similarly, individuals tend to underestimate the probability that either 
they or a loved one will become ill and require costly treatment (that 
is not covered, or not entirely covered, by their insurance plan).   
                                                 
120 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 247. 
121 Which involves a comparison of the costs and benefits of additional debt. 
122 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 245-46. 
123 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 119, at 179. 
124 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 250 (Consumers “want 
things and they want them now”; and many are “foolish enough to ignore” future 
costs and risks.); Rougeau, supra note 32, at 35 (“Credit cards make impulse buying 
easy and financially painless.”); EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 109 
(“[R]eal people have trouble keeping track of [card] balances during the month and 
resisting the ever-present temptation to use future income to enjoy life a bit more 
today.”); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 234, 
238-99 (1986) (hereinafter “Logic and Limits”) (arguing that individuals 
underestimate "the risks that their current consumption imposes on their future well-
being," and invoking the “human tendency to lack impulse control”—that is, a 
tendency "to choose current over postponed gratification, even if it is known that 
the latter holds in store a greater measure of benefits"). 
125 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 111. 
126 See, generally, Weinstein, supra note117. See also Thomas H. Jackson, The 
Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV.  L.  REV. 1393, 1411-121412 
(1985) (hereinafter “Fresh-Start”) (incomplete heuristics lead to systematic 
underestimation of risks). 
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Finally, individuals tend to underestimate the likelihood that they will 
lose their job, or underestimate the length of time it will take them to 
find a new job.
127  These and other manifestations of the optimism 
bias will lead consumers to underestimate the likelihood that they will 
be forced to resort to credit card borrowing.
128 
Of course, the optimism explanation and the imperfect willpower 
explanation are not mutually exclusive.  In fact, they reinforce one 
another.  Imperfect willpower might push the consumer into a fragile 
financial condition, rendering her more vulnerable to adverse events, 
such as an accident, illness, or job loss.
129 
 
3.  Underestimation of Forgetfulness 
 
While this Article focuses on the underestimation of future 
borrowing, a related bias that bolsters the explanatory power of the 
proposed theory should be mentioned.  One troubling feature of the 
credit card contract is the exorbitant penalty structure specified for 
late payments and for deviations from the credit limit.  A consumer 
may be forced to exceed her credit line or to defer payment beyond 
the due date as a result of an accident, an illness or unemployment, as 
discussed above.  But the consumer might also miss the due date 
simply because she forgot about it.  Similarly, she might exceed her 
credit line simply because she lost track of her total balance.  Since 
forgetfulness is a common trigger of the penalty clauses in the credit 
card contract, optimism regarding the extent of such forgetfulness is 
important in explaining this feature of credit card pricing.  Therefore, 
underestimation of forgetfulness, leading to underestimation of 
                                                 
127 S ULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 25, 114 (“The recently 
unemployed, hopeful that they will be back at work in a matter of days or weeks, 
may not be prepared to tell the children there will be no new soccer shoes this 
season or no back-to-school clothes.”). A related manifestation of the optimism bias 
concerns self-employed individuals and artists who take on credit card debt waiting 
for their “big break.” 
128 See, e.g., In re Eashai, 87 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e recognize the 
fragility of human nature. 'Human experience tells us debtors can be unreasonably 
optimistic despite their financial circumstances.'" (quoting In re Cox, 182 B.R. 626, 
635 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995))); In re Dougherty, 143 B.R. 23, 26 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
1992) (same). 
129  See S ULLIVAN,  WARREN  &  WESTBROOK,  supra note 2, at 113-5 (Many 
consumers reach a state of indebtedness that renders them vulnerable to unexpected 
costs).  See also Bruce A. Markell, Sorting and Sifting Fact From Fiction: 
Empirical Research and The Face of Bankruptcy: The Fragile Middle Class: 
Americans in Debt By Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 149 (2001) (book review) (“Americans who file 
bankruptcy generally have incurred debt beyond a rational ability to repay, and are 
thus vulnerable to economic events that challenge their fragile condition.”); Charles 
G. Hallinan, The “Fresh Start” Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical 
Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 115-16 (1986) (At 
the time of borrowing, debtors typically underestimate the likelihood of events that 
might render repayment difficult). 
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incurred penalties, should be considered in conjunction with the 
underestimation of future borrowing. 
 
B.  Explaining Credit Card Pricing 
 
1.  High Interest Rates 
 
If consumers underestimate future borrowing, they will also 
undervalue the cost of borrowing, specifically the high financing 
charges.  As a result issuers can, and in a competitive market must, 
shift more weight onto the interest rate element.  On the other hand, 
consumers fully appreciate the costs of the short-term non-contingent 
price elements.  Therefore, issuers focus competition on these 
elements.
130 Consider the following example:  
Credit card issuers need to set the levels of two price elements: 
the interest rate and the annual fee.  These issuers are competing for a 
single consumer, who will borrow $1,000 a year (for simplicity, 
assume that the consumer will retain an average balance of $1,000 
during the year).  The annual cost to an issuer of maintaining the 
consumer’s account is $20.  The cost of funds to the issuer, which 
determines the issuer’s financing costs, is 5% (which means that the 
cost of lending $1,000 is $50).  
In a well-functioning, competitive market, the issuers in this 
example would set an annual fee of $20 and an interest rate of 5%.
131  
But what if the consumer underestimates her future borrowing? To 
take an extreme case, assume that when signing the credit card 
contract, the consumer believes that she will not borrow on her card, 
and will use only its transacting feature.  With such underestimation, 
the $20 annual fee and the 5% interest rate scheme cannot be 
sustained in equilibrium.  Specifically, in competition between the 
issuers, an issuer that offers a card with no annual fee and a 7% 
interest rate will get the consumer’s business.  This price scheme will 
be more appealing to the underestimating consumer, and will still 
cover the issuer’s overall costs.  Since the consumer believes that she 
will not borrow on her card, she is insensitive to the interest rate (in 
this extreme example she would not mind even a 100% interest rate), 
                                                 
130  Cf. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 1218  (2003) (arguing, in a related 
context, that not only will bounded rationality prevent market pressure from forcing 
sellers to provide efficient terms, “under plausible assumptions, market pressure 
actually will force sellers to provide low-quality form terms, whether or not those 
terms are either socially efficient or optimal for buyers as a class”). 
131 To be precise, in the simplified example discussed in the text any combination of 
an annual fee and an interest rate according to which the consumer pays $70 overall 
can be sustained in a competitive market.  However, as soon as the example is 
extended to more than one consumer and heterogeneity with respect to the amount 
borrowed is allowed, the ($20, 5%) combination emerges as the only feasible 
contract. 
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but she is sensitive to the non-contingent annual fee.  Thus, 
comparing the ($20, 5%) contract to the ($0, 7%) contract, the latter 
seems more attractive.
132 
Underestimation of future borrowing shifts the competition in the 
credit card market from the long-term contingent price elements to the 
short-term non-contingent price elements.  Since competition is 
biased away from the interest rate dimension, the puzzle of high 
interest rates is solved.
133 
Importantly, the high interest rates equilibrium can be sustained 
even if only a subset of all consumers underestimate their future 
borrowing.  In such a heterogeneous environment, by lowering the 
interest rate, issuers will attract consumers who fully intend to borrow 
and are therefore sensitive to the interest rate.  These consumers are, 
on average, bad credit risks, as implied by their inability to obtain less 
expensive credit.  This adverse selection problem suggests that 
lowering interest rates may reduce the issuers’ profits.
134 
 
2.  No Annual or Per-Transaction Fees 
 
I have shown that credit card issuers, as profit maximizing firms, 
have a very good reason for setting low annual fees. Due to the 
underestimation bias, consumers are insensitive to interest rates.   
They are, however, quite sensitive to the annual fee.  Thus, 
competition concentrates on the annual fee dimension. Issuers attract 
consumers by offering low (or zero) annual fees; and then extract 
significant interest payments from those consumers.
135 
                                                 
132 From the issuer’s perspective, on the other hand, both contracts provide identical 
revenues – just large enough to cover the issuer’s costs.  This is a feature of the 
competition between the many credit card issuers. In a competitive credit card 
market competition dissipates issuers’ rents, and the only question is how these 
rents are dissipated. In standard markets supra-competitive rents are dissipated 
through price competition, which benefits consumers and increases welfare. In the 
credit card market, prices remain high, and rents are dissipated through increased 
costs. Issuers’ costs increase as they compete by offering various short-term perks, 
or more importantly by lowering the standards for issuing credit. 
133 The preceding analysis assumes that consumers underestimate future borrowing 
regardless of the level of the interest rate. This assumption might not be realistic, 
especially when the underestimation bias derives from consumers’ hyperbolic 
discounting. If the interest rate is not too high, the consumer will both borrow at 
T=1 and correctly anticipate such borrowing at T=0. Only when the interest rate is 
raised above a certain threshold does the preference reversal phenomenon occur, 
leading consumers to underestimate future borrowing. This suggests a second 
rationale for high interest rates. Not only do high interest rates exploit consumers’ 
underestimation of future borrowing, but also high interest rates may play an 
important role in generating the underestimation bias. 
134 See Ausubel, supra note 12, at 70-71. See also EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra 
note 13, at 250 (arguing that issuers’ fear of adverse selection, i.e. attracting 
consumers who are more likely to default, prevents them from reducing credit card 
interest rate). 
135 See Ausubel, supra note 12, at 72 (“[T]he experience of credit card marketers is 
that consumers are much more sensitive to increases in the annual fee than to 
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For a similar reason issuers do not charge per-transaction fees 
and, in fact, set a per-transaction price that is negative, once the 
benefits or rewards commonly attached to credit card purchases are 
taken into account.  The issuers forgo the per-transaction fee and give 
out these costly benefits, knowing that they will recoup their 
investment through long-term interest payments.  Specifically, 
benefits that are either non-contingent or contingent on transacting, 
but not on borrowing, are not subject to the underestimation bias.   
Therefore, issuers compete on the benefits dimension of the credit 
card contract. 
For consumers who use their credit card solely for transacting 
(and do not borrow at all), the credit card is essentially free.  But most 
consumers are not pure transactors.  As noted above, approximately 
three-quarters of credit-card holders borrow on their credit cards, and 
credit card issuers make the bulk of their revenues from finance 
charges paid by these borrowers.  Consequently, while there may be 
some cross-subsidization between borrowers and transactors, issuers 
are not losing from the absence of annual and per-transaction fees.
136 
The absence of annual and per-transaction fees highlights the 
bundling of transacting and financing services – a central feature of 
the credit card.  Without this bundling issuers could not afford to set 
zero annual and per-transaction fees.  While they sacrifice some 
revenues that could be extracted from pure transactors, the issuers 
more than compensate for these lost revenues by charging high 
interest rates from the borrowers.
137 
The underestimation theory suggests that many consumers may 
obtain a credit card primarily for its transacting service, believing that 
                                                                                                                  
commensurate increases in the interest rate.”); EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 
13, at 225 (the prime selection criterion in credit card choice for 15% of consumers 
is the “no annual fee” term); id. at 247 (evidence of competition on the annual rate 
dimension). A lower annual fee is also instrumental in increasing other revenue 
sources (beyond financing charges), such as late fees and over-limit fees. See id. at 
260 (“It is certainly possible, in theory, that issuers who reduce their annual fees 
may raise other fees less visible to consumers. Available data on annual and service 
fees [e.g. late fees, over-limit fees] strongly suggest that, over time, issuers in the 
aggregate have done just this.”). 
136 Finance charges (i.e. interest payments) constitute 78% of the revenues earned 
by credit cared issuers. See E VANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 164-65. 
Evans & Schmalensee report that “[credit card issuers] have chosen to collect a 
larger portion of their revenues from finance charges.” Id. at 167. But issuers extract 
revenues indirectly also from pure transactors, through the fee that merchants pay to 
the issuer whenever they complete a sale charged to the consumer’s credit card. See 
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 160-61. 
137 Charge cards, on the other hand, cannot manipulate this tradeoff. A comparison 
between the division of revenues of credit card and charge card issuers is 
instructive. Revenues of credit card issuers are divided as follows: 78% finance 
charges (interest), 10% interchange fees, 6% late and other fees, 4% cash advance 
fees, and 2% annual fees. On the other hand, for American Express, who has a 
major charge card business, 66% of revenues come from merchant discount fees, 
19% from card fees and only 15% from finance charges. See E VANS  & 
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 164-65. 
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they will not use the financing service (or substantially 
underestimating the extent to which they will use the financing 
service).  But after the credit card is already in her purse, the 
consumer does in fact borrow on the credit card.  A sharper separation 
between transacting and financing could mitigate the underestimation 
problem.  
Arguably, the market has already provided for the requisite 
unbundling of transacting and borrowing.  A consumer who believes 
that she will not borrow at all can get a debit card or a charge card 
that provides only transacting services.  Later on, if the consumer 
realizes that she does need to borrow, she can obtain a credit card; but 
at this stage underestimation is no longer a problem. 
This solution, however, suffers from an important shortcoming.  
Since credit card issuers can exploit consumers’ underestimation of 
financing charges to lower the annual fee, they will be able to secure a 
competitive advantage relative to the issuers of charge cards.   
Bundling of transacting and financing services creates unfair 
competition on the annual fee dimension between credit card issuers 
on the one hand and charge card issuers on the other hand.
138  The 
underestimation theory thus provides an explanation for the market 
shift from charge cards to credit cards.
139 
Unlike the charge card, the debit card shares the no-annual-fee 
attribute of the credit card.  Credit card issuers’ fear of the debit card 
may explain the substantial delay in the introduction of debit cards in 
the United States.
140  As argued above, credit card issuers benefit 
from the bundling of transacting and financing services, and thus had 
an incentive to resist debit cards, which threaten such bundling.  But 
even debit cards do not solve the bundling problem.  While typically 
charging no annual fee, debit cards cannot compete with the other 
benefits offered by credit card issuers.  Again, credit card issuers can 
afford to offer more lucrative benefits thanks to the financing 
revenues they extract from consumers.
141 
                                                 
138 The bundling of transacting and financing may also constitute illegal tying in 
violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, and/or Section 1 and/or Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, as argued in a recent antitrust class action suit attacking Visa and 
MasterCard’s honor-all-cards rule. See supra note 68. See also Sujit Chakravorti & 
Alpa Shah, A Study of the Interrelated Bilateral Transactions in Credit Card 
Networks, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI. EMERGING PAYMENTS OCCASIONAL PAPER 
SERIES, 2001, No. 2, at 23-24. 
139 For instance, American Express, whose charge card preceded the Visa and 
MasterCard credit cards, has fallen behind in the competition with Visa and 
MasterCard. See supra Section I.C.2. 
140 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 55, 76-77 and ch. 12 (“[D]ebit 
cards languished [in the United States] until the mid-1990s.”). 
141  See Mann, supra note 40 (describing the disadvantages of debit cards, 
specifically no float, no benefits and fewer legal protections); See Chakravorti & 
Shah, supra note 138, at 23 (debit cards do not offer the benefit programs, extended 
warranties and free credit (until the end of the billing cycle) that credit cards offer). 
Moreover, since “[u]nlike credit cards, debit cards can generally be issued only to a 




3.  Teaser Rates 
 
Why are teaser rates so effective? The answer is that a consumer 
with a current financing need will take the teaser rate bait.  For such a 
consumer, who has already decided that she will soon incur debt on 
her new credit card, the interest rate on this debt will be important.  
Moreover, if the new card permits balance transfers from old cards, 
the switch may present a current benefit.  On the other hand, the 
consumer, who underestimates her future borrowing, will not mind 
the steep jump in the interest rate from the low teaser rate to the high 
post-introductory level.
142  
To better understand the operation of teaser rates, let us return to 
the hyperbolic discounting model.  Consider two pairs of points on a 
time line starting at T=0, such that the temporal distance between the 
two points in the first pair is equal to the temporal distance between 
the two points in the second pair, and the first pair is closer to T=0 
relative to the second pair.  Hyperbolic discounting implies that the 
discounting, from the T=0 perspective, between the two points in the 
first pair will be greater than the discounting between the two points 
in the second pair.  Consequently, the likelihood of a preference 
reversal is greater for the temporally distant pair.  Returning to teaser 
rates, this implies that the likelihood of unanticipated borrowing is 
increasing in the temporal distance between T=0 and the point in time 
when the actual borrowing decision will be made.  This means that 
consumers are less likely to underestimate their short-run level of 
borrowing, which would make them more sensitive to short-term 
interest rates. 
Figure 2 offers a graphic illustration of short-run borrowing 
(T=1,2), as compared to long-run borrowing (T=3,4).  While a 
preference reversal is obtained with respect to long-term borrowing, 
leading to underestimation of future borrowing, there is no preference 
reversal with respect to short-run borrowing.  The consumer both 
                                                                                                                  
bank’s own depository customers,” EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 50, 
209, the competitive threat of the debit card is limited. 
142 See Ausubel, supra note 27, at 262-63 (“consumers may have become more 
realistic about their current levels of borrowings, but the underestimation hypothesis 
may still powerfully apply to borrowings beyond the introductory period. The most 
desirable group of customers would then be strongly attracted by the promise of a 
low interest rate today, but would underestimate the relevance of the much higher 
interest rate some months down the road.”) But, why would a consumer, who has 
already accumulated debt on a card with a high post-introductory rate, not transfer 
the balance to a new card with a low introductory rate? One answer is that with the 
information available to issuers it is unlikely that a consumer carrying significant 
debt on one card would be offered a new low rate card (especially not one with a 
balance transfer option). A different answer returns to the underestimation bias. The 
indebted consumer might underestimate the true cost of her debt—the present value 
of the expected stream of interest payments plus late and over-limit fees. The 
consumer might also underestimate the period that it would take her to pay-off the 
debt. See infra subsection 5. 
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believes at T=0 that she will borrow, and indeed borrows at T=1.  
Since there is no underestimation of short-run borrowing, the 
consumer would be more sensitive to short-run interest rates.  This 
explains the emerging competition between credit card issuers on the 


















Another related explanation for the prevalence of teaser rates is 
based on the concept of switching costs.  In its simple form, the 
argument is that the costs of switching from one credit card to another 
prevent such switching, at least to a certain degree.  Therefore, issuers 
can lure consumers with low introductory interest rates, counting on 
switching costs to prevent (at least some) consumers from switching 
to another card once the introductory period is over.
143  The problem 
with this simple version of the switching cost argument is that rational 
consumers would anticipate the lock-in effect.  Recognizing that they 
would not switch to a new card, consumers would weigh also the high 
post-introductory interest rates in their credit card choice.  
The underestimation theory suggests a more persuasive version of 
the switching cost story.  Even if consumers anticipate lock-in, they 
still underestimate the cost of lock-in, since they do not expect to 
borrow (or to borrow as much) in the future.  Hyperbolic discounting 
                                                 
143 See Ausubel, supra note 27, at 263 (“[E]conomic theory suggests that firms in a 
market with substantial search/switch costs will find advantage in utilizing 
introductory offers or sign-up bonuses to lure new customers.”). In the credit card 
market there may be non-trivial switching costs. See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW 
CENTER, TRUTH IN LENDING 262 (4
th ed. 1999). Rewards programs based on the 
accumulation of points or frequent flyer miles generate additional switching costs.  
Interestingly, while the teaser rate strategy surely relies on switching costs to limit 
defection at the end of the introductory period, one of the main purposes of teaser 
rates is to induce switching. 














Fig. 2: Borrowing in the near versus the more distant future 
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reinforces this revised version of the switching cost argument.  Naïve 
hyperbolic discounters may wrongly anticipate that they would switch 
to a new card, but in fact will not switch when the introductory period 
ends.  From an ex ante perspective, when both the switching costs and 
the benefits from switching lie in the future, a naïve hyperbolic 
discounter might believe that she will switch to a new card at the end 
of the introductory period offered by the old card.  However, when 
the introductory period offered by the old card ends, the switching 
costs are imminent while the benefits from switching still lie in the 
future.  Thus, applying the high short-term discount rate, the 
consumer may decide not to switch.  This more sophisticated version 
of the switching cost argument helps explain consumers’ heightened 




4.  Late and Over-Limit Fees 
 
As described above, credit card contracts often include extremely 
high fees and penalties for late payment and for deviations from the 
credit line.  Why do consumers acquiesce to such penalties?  Why 
don’t they push issuers to lower these penalties or do away with them 
altogether?  If consumers were more sensitive to late fees and other 
penalties in their credit card choice, then issuers would not include 
such provisions.  The problem is that these penalties are largely 
invisible to consumers. And underestimation—of future borrowing 
and of forgetfulness—provides the invisibility cloak.  Consumers 
undervalue the costs of these penalty clauses, since they 
underestimate the probability of paying late or exceeding their credit 
limit.
145 
If consumers underestimate the probability of incurring penalties, 
then profit-maximizing issuers will set high penalties.  Indeed, in 
Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank,
146 the bank’s “Credit Card Task Force” 
proposed increasing “late” and “overlimit” fees as a “good source of 
                                                 
144  See  DellaVigna & Malmendier, supra note 92, at 26-7 (naïve agents 
underestimate the probability that they will ‘renew the contract,’ i.e. continue to 
borrow after the introductory period). Cf. Gal Zauberman, The Intertemporal 
Dynamics of Consumer Lock-In, J.  CONSUMER  RES. (forthcoming Dec. 2003) 
(consumers fail to anticipate the impact of future switching costs; hence even the 
reduced search costs in internet-driven shopping can generate lock-in). 
145 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 211 (“Service fees (such as late 
fees, over-limit fees, and finance charges on cash advances) provide revenues to 
issuers but are likely to be largely invisible to most consumers trying to choose 
between different credit card plans.”); ELIZABETH  WARREN  &  JAY  LAWRENCE 
WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 458 (2001) (Consumers are 
not very concerned about late and over-limit fees). See also Korobkin, supra note 
130. Korobkin argues that consumers do not consider non-salient terms. The 
underestimation theory explains why penalty terms are not salient to consumers. 
146 235 Cal. App. 3d 1383 (1991). 




147  Penalty fees are perceived as a “good source of 
revenue,” because the industry perceives—in line with the 
underestimation theory—that “[t]here (are) very few cardholders that 
switch cards because the late fee is too high.”
148 
 
5.  Low Minimum Monthly Payments 
 
The practice of setting low amortization rates targets consumers’ 
underestimation of the period it will take them to repay their credit 
card debt.  The hyperbolic discounting phenomenon, which accounts 
for the underestimation of future borrowing, also explains consumers’ 
underestimation of the repayment period.  A hyperbolic discounter 
would anticipate a quick repayment schedule, but when actual 
payments need to be made she might revert to the minimum payment, 
underestimating the resulting future finance charges.  According to 
one account:  “Each month the debtor might make the small minimum 
payment with a vow to start paying off the balance the next 
month.”
149  More generally, the same reasons that lead a consumer to 
underestimate her future borrowing will lead her to overestimate her 
ability to repay quickly. 
Since issuers profit from slow repayment, they often design the 
credit card bill such that the minimum payment figure is more salient 
than the total balance figure, in order to “persuade” consumers to pay 
only the minimum payment.  For instance, the “minimum payment” 
box is often closer to the “actual payment” box and emphasized with 
a distinct color or font size, while the “total balance” box is further 
away and deemphasized.  Or, the minimum payment figure is the only 
figure appearing on the payment stub itself.
150 
 
C.  The Rational Choice Critique 
 
The behavioral theory developed in this Article accounts for the 
systematic pricing patterns observed in the credit card market.   
Specifically, this theory explains why competition focuses on the 
short-term elements of the credit card contract driving the price of 
these elements below marginal cost, and pushing the long-term price 
elements above marginal cost.  Despite its explanatory power, the 
underestimation theory, as a behavioral economics theory, will likely 
encounter some resistance from ardent rational choice scholars.  This 
                                                 
147 Id. at 1389. 
148  Credit Card Fees Soar Again, CNNMoney, August 18, 1998 (quoting Peter 
Davidson, Executive VP at Speer & Associates in Atlanta). The trend of shortening 
grace periods further bolsters the revenue-generating power of penalty fees, 
exploiting consumers’ forgetfulness. See supra note 107. 
149 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 119, at 178. 
150 I wish to thank Benjamin Roin for pointing out this common feature of the credit 
card bill. 
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subsection argues that the underestimation theory withstands the 
rational choice critique. 
 
1.  A Rational Choice Theory? 
 
Can the pricing patterns observed in the credit card market be 
explained by a non-behavioral theory? Dagobert Brito and Peter 
Hartley have argued that high credit card interest rates can be 
explained by the transaction costs involved in obtaining credit from 
alternative, lower interest rate sources, specifically bank loans.
151  
Transaction costs may well play an important role, but they cannot 
account for the observed pricing patterns in the credit card market.  
For one, with current technology it is no longer clear why the cost of 
providing a close-end loan would be greater than the cost of 
maintaining a credit card account.  In addition, this transaction costs 
model only explains why credit card issuers can set a higher overall 
price; it does not explain why issuers systematically choose to use 
interest rates rather than annual or per-transaction fees to achieve this 
higher price.  Other rational choice models similarly focus on the 
interest rate dimension, and thus cannot account for the multi-
dimensional pricing patterns identified in this Article.
152 
An alternative explanation that is not confined to the interest rate 
dimension relies on the notion of rational ignorance. According to this 
theory, consumers do not read their credit card contract, and therefore 
are insensitive to variations in different provisions of this contract. 
But consumers are extremely sensitive to some components of the 
credit card contract, specifically to the short-term components.
153 
Moreover, information on post-introductory interest rates and other 
long-term elements of the credit card price is readily available.
154 
                                                 
151 Dagobert L. Brito & Peter R. Hartley, Consumer Rationality and Credit Cards, 
103 J. POL. ECON. 4000 (1995). See also Zywicki, supra note 13, at 100.  
152 For instance, Loretta Mester, using a screening model with collateralized loans 
and unsecured credit card loans, explains why credit card interest rates are not 
sensitive to reductions in the bank’s cost of funds. See Loretta J. Mester, Why Are 
Credit Card Rates Sticky? 4 ECON.  TH. 505 (1994). Mester, however, does not 
explain why credit card interests exceed the risk-adjusted cost of funds, nor does she 
explain the other pricing patterns identified in this Article. Other models offer 
rational choice explanations for high interest rates, assuming close-end credit. See, 
e.g., Christine A. Parlour & Uday Rajan, Competition in Loan Contracts, 91 AMER. 
ECON. REV. 1311 (2001) (high interest rates are sustained in equilibrium, as the fear 
of triggering default—by offering a contract with a lower rate but an increased 
amountand thus inducing more borrowing—restricts price competition); Thorsten 
Broecker, Credit-Worthiness Tests and Interbank Competition, 58 ECONOMETRICA 
429 (1990) (deriving above-marginal-cost interest rates in a general credit market 
model with adverse selection). 
153 See supra Sections B.2 and B.3. 
154 Federal regulations mandate salient disclosure of such terms. See infra Section 
V.A.1. And numerous websites, as well as off-line publications, provide immediate 
comparisons between cards on the interest rate and other dimensions. 
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Therefore, imperfect information cannot account for the observed 
equilibrium in the credit card market.
155 
Finally, the rational choice models cannot explain why 
consumers, who are very sensitive to prices charged on most other 
goods and services, are simply insensitive to a central element of the 
credit card price—the interest rate.
 There is considerable evidence that 
consumers are not deterred by the high interest rate charged on credit 
card debt.
156 And issuers admit that consumers’ insensitivity to the 
long-term elements of the credit card price drives their business 
strategy.
157 
The behavioral theory developed in this Article explains why 
consumers are insufficiently sensitive to interest rates.  The rational 
choice models cannot explain this robust finding.  If the issuers 
themselves rely on consumers’ lack of sensitivity to interest rates in 
designing the credit card contract, a theory that ignores this behavioral 
regularity can at best provide only a partial explanation for credit card 
pricing. 
 
2.  The Ad-hoc Critique 
 
A behavioral economics theory, even when providing a closer fit 
with the data, might be susceptible to the ad-hoc critique.  This 
common objection attacks the underlying assumptions of the 
proposed behavioral model, arguing that the model is based on a 
randomly chosen behavioral bias, whose robustness in real-world 
                                                 
155 Cf. Korobkin, supra note 130, at 1217-18 (“Efficiency requires not only that 
buyers be aware of the content of form contracts, but also that they fully incorporate 
that information into their purchase decisions.”). 
156 See supra notes 98-99 (Consumers are three times more sensitive to introductory 
rates, compared to long-term rates, yet most borrowing is done at the high post-
introductory rates); Gross & Souleles, supra note 42, at 171 (finding only limited 
responsiveness of consumers to changes in the interest rate). See also SULLIVAN, 
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 133 (Reporting testimony of bankrupt 
consumers who admit to “not fully appreciating the implications of high interest 
rates.”); WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 145, at 458 (Consumers are not very 
concerned about how high interest rates might be). Consumer insensitivity to 
interest rates is not unique to credit cards. White and Munger found that recipients 
of new car loans were extremely insensitive to interest rates. See James J. White & 
Frank W. Munger, Consumer Sensitivity to Interest Rates: An Empirical Study of 
New-Car Buyers and Auto Loans, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1207 (1971). 
157 See Ausubel, supra note 12, at 72 (“[T]he experience of credit card marketers” is 
that “consumers are much more sensitive to increases in the annual fee than to 
commensurate increases in the interest rate.”) The fact that finance charges (i.e. 
interest payments) constitute 78% of the revenues earned by credit cared issuers 
speaks for itself. Evans and Schmalensee reason that “[t]his pattern may arise in part 
because of [credit card issuers’] view that the overall demand for credit is relatively 
insensitive to interest rates, a view supported by at least one empirical study and 
considerable folklore within the industry. EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, 
at 164-67. 




158  I am sympathetic to this skeptical view of 
behavioral economics.  One cannot simply draw a random bias from a 
hat, divorce it from the sterile laboratory environment where it was 
detected, and build a theory of markets and law around it.
159  
Therefore, I began my analysis not with a random bias, but rather 
with the identification of a systematic pattern of prices—a pattern that 
deviates from what would generally be expected in a competitive 
market.  The methodology adopted in this Article in its very design 
rebuts the robustness critique.  The behavioral bias must be 
sufficiently prevalent and important to generate the observed pricing 
scheme:  the bias must pass the market test. 
Only after a unique price pattern was identified, and a rational 
choice model was rejected, did the analysis proceed to probe for a 
potential behavioral explanation.  Moreover, the proposed behavioral 
theory did not rely on a random bias identified in a sterile laboratory 
experiment.  The underestimation theory was constructed on the 
foundation of behavioral regularities that have been extensively 
documented in many different real-world settings. 
 
IV.  REASONS FOR INTERVENTION IN THE CREDIT CARD MARKET 
 
A.  Efficiency Costs 
 
The short-term bias of the competitive forces in the credit card 
market produces high interest rates, but also short-term perks.  Is this 
outcome necessarily bad for consumers?  Unfortunately, the answer is 
yes.  The long term costs to consumers will generally outweigh the 
short-term benefits.
160  The biased competition  in the credit card 
market is welfare reducing.  
Recall the example from Section III.B.1, where biased 
competition was shown to raise the interest rate and reduce the annual 
rate.  What are the welfare consequences of this outcome?  Under the 
low interest rate, high annual rate contract ($20, 5%), the consumer 
                                                 
158 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the 
Law, 50  STAN.  L.  REV. 1551, 1552, 1558-61; Jennifer Arlen, The Future of 
Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law (Comment), 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1768-
69 (1998). 
159 See Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics? 51 
Vand. L. Rev. 1729, 1734 (1998) (arguing that strict conditions should be met 
before behavioral insights can be used as a basis for policy reform). See also Colin 
Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case 
for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212-14 (2003) (arguing 
that regulators should exercise caution when relying on bounded rationality and 
bounded will-power as a justification for legal intervention); Cass R. Sunstein & 
Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2003) (same); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,  The Uncertain Psychological 
Case for Paternalism (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (same). 
160 Although admittedly some sophisticated consumers may benefit from the biased 
competition. 
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ends-up paying $70.  And under the high interest rate, no annual fee 
contract ($0, 7%), the consumer also ends-up paying $70.  But are 
these two outcomes really identical from the consumer’s perspective, 
or from a broader welfare perspective?  As I argue below, the high 
interest rate, no annual fee contract induced by the biased competition 
might generate significant welfare costs. 
 
1.  Increasing the Costs of Financial Distress 
 
In the example, it was the consumer’s underestimation of her 
future borrowing that drove the interest rate up and the annual rate 
down.  But what the consumer underestimated at T=0, she is forced to 
bear at T=1. At T=0, when the consumer feels financially secure, the 
high interest rate, no annual fee contract provides her with the utility 
from saving $20 on annual fees.  At T=1, when the consumer realizes 
that she needs to borrow on her credit card, the same contract imposes 
the disutility of the additional $20 in interest payments.
161  
Decreasing marginal utility from money, a basic tenet of 
economic theory,
162 implies that the T=1 welfare cost of paying the 
additional $20 in interest is greater than the T=0 welfare gain from 
saving $20 in annual fees.  Since money is more valuable when one 
has less of it, e.g. when one must resort to borrowing, from a welfare 
perspective the increased interest rate will generally outweigh the 
reduction in the annual rate.
163 
In fact, the difference between the T=1 welfare cost and the T=0 
welfare gain is even greater than described above.  Since the ex ante 
probability that the consumer will pay interest is smaller than one, say 
0.5, the terms of the high interest rate, low annual fee contract would 
be ($0, 9%), rather than ($0, 7%).  If the issuer expects to receive the 
interest payment only fifty percent of the time, he must increase the 
interest rate to cover his costs.  Assuming that the welfare of a 
consumer in financial distress is sufficiently sensitive to an additional 
                                                 
161 Formally, let  0 w  and  0 1 w w <  denote the consumer’s wealth at T=0 and T=1, 
respectively, after incurring any cost associated with the benchmark low interest 
rate, high annual fee contract (“contract 1”). Let x denote the T=0 saving in annual 
fees under the high interest, no annual fee contract (“contract 2”), and let y denote 
the T=1 cost in terms of higher interest rates under contract 2. Following the 
example analyzed in the text, we initially assume that  y x = . The consumer’s T=0 
utility is  () x w u + 0  under contract 2, as opposed to  ( ) 0 w u  under contract 1. The 
consumer’s T=1 utility is  ( ) y w u − 1  under contract 2, as opposed to  () 1 w u  under 
contract 1. 
162 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 186 (1987) 
(“[W]hile the party’s utility increases with the level of his wealth, it does so at a 
decreasing rate.”); Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-11 (6
th ed. 
2003) (“[A]nother dollar… will mean less to a person as his wealth increases.”). 
Formally, decreasing marginal utility implies that the utility function,  () ⋅ u , is 
concave. 
163 Formally, given  0 1 w w <  decreasing marginal utility implies that 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 0 1 1 w u x w u y w u w u − + > − −  (still assuming  y x = ). 
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reduction in wealth, these higher additional interest charges further 
increase the cost of financial distress.
164 
The abstract principle of decreasing marginal utility from money 
reflects the very concrete real-world experience of credit card holders.  
When a consumer is employed in a well-paying job, saving a 
relatively small amount in annual fees is a nice but insignificant perk.  
But when the consumer is in between jobs, struggling to make ends 
meet, this same modest amount, and often a significantly larger 
amount, which returns to haunt her in the form of increased interest 
payments, might be quite painful.  Similarly, when the consumer is 
facing the financial burden of the mounting medical bills generated by 
an unanticipated illness, the cost of increased finance charges on 
credit card debt outweighs any benefit from prior savings on annual 
rates back in the time before financial distress hit.
165 
In addition, mounting credit card debt fueled by high interest 
rates is a major cause of consumer bankruptcy.
166  The adverse 
consequences of financial distress and bankruptcy further bolster the 
asymmetry between the often minor benefit from reduced annual rates 
when times are good and the potentially significant cost of increased 
interest charges when times are bad.
167 
Finally, by placing more consumers at risk of financial distress 
the underestimation of future borrowing and the resulting biased 
competition increases the number of individuals who, instead of 
contributing to society, will be forced to rely on society for help.
168  
The significant administrative costs associated with bankruptcy 
                                                 
164 Formally, assume that the consumer pays interest with probability q. 
Consequently,  x q x y > = . If  ( ) 1 ' w u  is sufficiently large, 
() ( ) [] ( ) ( ) [] ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 w u x w u x w u w u q x w u w u q y w u w u q − + > − − > − − ⋅ = − − ⋅ , 
namely paying a larger amount, y, with probability q is more costly than paying a 
smaller amount, x, with certainty. 
165  See  Jackson, Fresh-Start, supra  note 126, at 1411-12 (arguing that financial 
distress, caused by e.g. unemployment, divorce or illness, can make it very painful 
for consumers to repay their loans); Hallinan, supra  note 129 (same); Richard 
Hynes, Overoptimism and Bankruptcy Policy (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) (noting the welfare cost incurred when a debtor in financial distress is 
forced to pay). 
166 See supra Section I.B.2. 
167 The result that the T=1 welfare cost outweighs the T=0 welfare gain does not 
depend on the actual materialization of adverse events such as job loss and illness or 
on the increased risk of bankruptcy that they create. It is enough that biased 
competition shifts costs to periods when the consumer is in a worse financial 
situation. In this situation any further subtraction from the shrinking financial 
cushion increases the risk of financial distress in the event of a job loss, illness, 
accident or other adverse event. Since consumers are risk averse, this increased risk 
is sufficient to raise the T=1 welfare cost above the T=0 welfare gain. See A. 
MITCHELL  POLINSKY, AN  INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 59 (3
rd ed. 
2003) (A standard assumption in the economic analysis of risk is that “the higher a 
person’s wealth, the less averse he is to a given size risk.”). 
168 Compare Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the 
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom 
of Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995). 
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proceedings as well as other negative externalities associated with 
even less extreme forms of financial distress constitute another 
welfare cost that will be born, at least in part, by consumers.
169 
The identified behavioral bias leads consumers to underestimate 
the likelihood of experiencing a T=1 welfare cost that would 
outweigh the current T=0 welfare gain.  This bias on the demand side 
of the credit card market limits the welfare-enhancing power of 
competition.  Competition among credit card issuers guarantees only 
that issuers will not profit from the high interest rate, low annual fee 
outcome.  It does not prevent the potential harm to consumers that 
such a short-term bias entails.  Underestimation of future borrowing 
biases competition among issuers, shifting costs to periods of 
financial distress when they are most difficult to bear.  Competition, 
even biased competition, still dissipates issuers’ gains.  With the 
underestimation bias in play, however, competition no longer 
guarantees the maximization of consumer welfare. 
 
2.  Inefficient Use of Credit Cards 
 
An additional cost of the underestimation of future borrowing 
stems from the distorted incentives generated by biased competition.  
From a welfare perspective, the importance of marginal-cost pricing 
lies in the efficient incentives generated by such pricing.  If a 
consumer, in order to obtain a good or a service, must pay a price 
equal to the cost of manufacturing the good or providing the service, 
then the consumer will choose to obtain the good or the service if and 
only if she values it more than its cost.  Thus private incentives are 
aligned with the social objective of welfare maximization.  Goods and 
services are produced only when the benefit exceeds the cost, and an 
optimal allocation of resources is achieved.
170 
However, as demonstrated in the previous sections, in the credit 
card market prices systematically deviate from marginal cost.  Long-
term contingent price elements are set above marginal cost; and short-
term non-contingent price elements are set below marginal cost (and 
even at a negative level, if benefits programs are counted).  These 
deviations from marginal-cost pricing distort incentives and reduce 
welfare. 
Specifically, to the extent that teaser rates are set below the 
marginal cost of funds, excessive borrowing will occur in the 
introductory period.  In addition, the absence of annual and per-
transaction fees implies that consumers will obtain too many credit 
                                                 
169 See Mann, supra note 40 (“[F]inancial distress generates substantial external 
costs for the economy, costs that are not borne entirely by the lenders whose debts 
are not repaid or by the borrowers that fail to repay them.”) 
170 See generally ANDREW MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY, ch. 10 
(1995). 
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cards and use these cards excessively for transacting purposes (e.g. 
for $1 transactions).
171  
As collateral damage, benefits programs skew incentives beyond 
the credit card market.  For instance, if merchants participating in a 
credit card issuer’s benefits program price their products at marginal 
cost absent the discount provided by the benefits program, then 
cardholders face below-marginal-cost prices, leading to excessive 
purchasing.  Similarly, if a cardholder is entitled to free rental car 
insurance, this cardholder will get insurance even when the cost of 
providing insurance exceeds its value to the cardholder. And, since 
free insurance makes car rental cheaper, this benefit might also lead to 
excessive car rental. 
 
B.  Distributional Concerns 
 
Not only efficiency is threatened by the distorted pricing in the 
credit card market.  The systematic overpricing of credit services and 
underpricing of transacting services means that transactors are being 
cross-subsidized by borrowers.  The high interest rates and exorbitant 
penalties paid by consumers who end-up borrowing on their credit 
cards finance the free cards and the benefits programs enjoyed by 
consumers who use their cards for transacting purposes only.
172  
While a propensity to borrow is not perfectly correlated with socio-
economic status, the cross-subsidization between the different 
consumer groups in the credit card market is highly regressive.  This 
troubling distributive effect provides another reason to consider legal 
intervention in the credit card market.  
 
C.  Freedom of Contract and Its Failure 
 
The efficiency and distributive implications described in 
Subsections A and B suggest that there may be room for legal 
intervention in the credit card market.  Such intervention, however, 
cannot be considered before a general objection to intervention in 
contractual relations—the “freedom of contract” objection—is 
rebutted.  If two parties, specifically a credit card issuer and a 
consumer, voluntarily enter into a contract, then presumptively both 
parties are made better off by this contract.
173  Moreover, any specific 
                                                 
171 See Sujit Chakravorti & William R. Emmons, Who Pays for Credit Cards?, FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF CHI. EMERGING PAYMENTS OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, 2001, 
No. 1, at 1 (it may well be that credit cards are "overused"). 
172 Similarly, consumers who switch from one teaser rate to the next, thus enjoying 
under-priced or even free credit, are being cross-subsidized by the majority of 
consumers who end up paying the high post-introductory rates. 
173 I abstract from limits on freedom of contract based on asymmetric information. 
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, ch. 5 
(1993). For a discussion regarding limits on freedom of contract based on possible 
adverse effects on third parties, i.e. externalities—see infra note 178. 
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term in the contract should maximize the parties’ overall welfare, 
and—through proper adjustments of the contract price—should also 
be Pareto optimal, namely increase the welfare of each party.
174 
The force of the freedom of contract argument, however, is 
significantly reduced when one (or both) of the parties to the contract 
holds inaccurate perceptions of the future.  The freedom of contract 
paradigm is based on the presumption that contracting parties 
correctly anticipate their future actions and thus the future 
consequences of the contract they have signed.  Without an accurate 
perception of the future, freedom of contract cannot defend future-
oriented contracts.
175 
Still, claims of paternalism are sometimes voiced against any 
attempt to intervene in the credit card market, and even against any 
contention that this market suffers from a basic market failure:   
“Another common complaint about credit cards is that they entice 
people to accumulate too much debt. This complaint is partly 
paternalistic. Some people dislike borrowing just as other people 
frown on eating meat. Neither preference is wrong, but we would 
argue that neither should be imposed on others.”
176  
But is credit card borrowing truly comparable to “eating meat”?  
A vegetarian would not normally anticipate having salad, only to end 
up ordering steak.  Yet precisely such reversals control credit card 
borrowing.  Ex ante, the consumer does not anticipate borrowing, and 
perhaps even has a preference against borrowing, but she ends up 
borrowing nevertheless.
177  The underestimation theory suggests that 
credit card borrowing does not necessarily reveal a preference for 
borrowing.  Freedom of contract may thus prevent, rather than 
promote the fulfillment of the consumer’s true ex ante preferences.
178 
                                                 
174 See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, ch. 
13 (2004). Pareto efficiency implies that both parties will be better-off (or, at least, 
not worse-off), compared to a benchmark contract without the efficient term. 
175 This reply to the freedom of contract objection resembles arguments made with 
respect to non-dickered terms in from contracts, namely that the consumer does not 
really consent to such terms and therefore neither efficiency nor equity can be 
inferred.  See,  e.g., KARL  LLEWELLYN,  THE  COMMON  LAW  TRADITION 362-63 
(1960); Todd. D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983).  The quintessential dickered term, however, is the price 
term, which in the credit card contract includes as its main component the long-term 
interest rate.  Accordingly, this Article must go beyond the traditional accounts of 
non-dickered terms in form contracts. 
176 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 109. On paternalism in contract 
law, see generally Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in 
Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal 
Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism 
and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983). 
177 See THALER, supra note 8, at 98, 105 (“The problem of dynamic inconsistency 
raises questions about consumer sovereignty. Who is sovereign, the self who sets 
the alarm clock to rise early, or the self who shuts it off the next morning and goes 
back to sleep?”) 
178 The normative force of the freedom of contract argument in the credit card 
context is also limited by the existence of externalities. As described in the 





V.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The underestimation theory provides the basis for considering 
legal intervention in the credit card market.  It also guides the design 
of potential policy responses.  In this Section, I consider several 
policy proposals targeting the identified failure in the credit card 
market.  I begin, in subsection A, by examining potential avenues for 
ex ante regulation.  I argue that given the nature of the problem and 
the relative institutional competencies, ex ante regulation should be 
preferred over ex post judicial review.  Nevertheless, I proceed, in 
subsection B, to explore the option of ex post intervention, identifying 
the potential benefits and the looming costs of an attempt to redraw 
the boundaries of common law doctrines in light of the 
underestimation theory.
179 
The policy proposals examined in this Section suffer from well-
known shortcomings.  The imperfect information available to 
regulators and judges and the possibility of political capture limit the 
appeal of most forms of legal intervention.  Moreover, regulators and 
judges might suffer from behavioral biases that limit their ability to 
cure the market failure originating from consumers’ underestimation 
bias.  Finally, the implementation costs of the different policy 
proposals must be weighed against the potential benefits from these 
proposals.  
A comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of each policy 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  Rather, this Section identifies the 
major legal avenues available to policymakers concerned with the 
repercussions of the underestimation bias.   
 
A.  Ex Ante Regulation 
 
This subsection considers several forms of ex ante regulation. 
Since regulation aimed at protecting less sophisticated consumers 
might well impose costs on more sophisticated consumers, I begin by 
considering policy solutions that are least likely to harm sophisticated 
consumers.
180 
                                                                                                                  
preceding subsection, credit card debt and resulting financial distress often impose 
negative externalities on third parties and on society at large. Freedom of contract 
cannot defend a contract that harms third parties, whose interests were not 
represented in the design and execution of the contract. See, e.g., TREBILCOK, supra 
note 173, at ch. 3 (1993). 
179 The dichotomy between ex ante regulation and ex post review is clearly 
overstated. Many forms of ex ante regulation require some degree of ex post judicial 
enforcement. The question is how much discretion is left to the enforcing court, 
along the well-known lines of the rules versus standards distinction. 
180 This preference for policy responses that impose minimal costs on sophisticated 
parties follows the notion of “asymmetric paternalism” developed in Camerer et al., 




1.  Warnings, Disclosures, and the Truth-In-Lending Act 
 
The least obtrusive method of legal intervention relies on 
warnings and disclosures regarding the dangers inherent in the credit 
card contract.  If consumers’ underestimation of their future 
borrowing is responsible for the biased competition in the credit card 
market and for the resulting inefficiencies, then perhaps legal 
intervention can help cure the underestimation bias.
181   
The forced disclosure method of legal intervention appears to be 
more feasible than other, more interventionist alternatives. “In 1987-
1988, Congress rejected [several] proposed bills and amendments 
setting credit card interest rate ceilings but enacted a mandatory 
disclosure bill.”
182  The Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA)
183 was amended 
to require specific disclosures in credit and charge card applications 
and solicitations.
184  These provisions are interpreted by Federal 
Reserve Board Regulation Z,
185 which specifies the required 
disclosures.
186  
The declared purpose of TILA is “to assure a meaningful 
disclosure of credit terms . . . and to protect the consumer against 
inaccurate and unfair billing and credit card practices.”
187  T h e  
                                                                                                                  
supra  note 159, at 1212 (advocating asymmetric paternalism that “creates large 
benefits for those who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who 
are fully rational”). Imposing only minimal costs on sophisticated parties limits the 
possible objections to the proposed policies, and thus renders them more feasible. It 
should be noted, however, that while legal intervention might benefit less 
sophisticated consumers at the expense of more sophisticated consumers, absent 
legal intervention it is the sophisticated consumers that are being cross-subsidized 
by the less sophisticated consumers. 
181 See generally Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law (2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  Education may also prove helpful.  
See, generally, Susan Block-Lieb, Karen Gross & Richard Wiener, Lessons From 
the Trenches: Debtor Education in Theory and Practice, 7 FORD. J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
503 (2002). 
182 See Ausubel, supra note 12, at 74, n. 48.  See also THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET AL., 
THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 2-67 et seq. (1991). 
183 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. 
184 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c) (Disclosure in credit and charge card applications and 
solicitations). 
185 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.18, 226.5a. 
186 The required disclosures under TILA and Regulation Z include: the identity of 
the creditor, the amount financed, the annual percentage rate, late fees and 
“overlimit” fees.  See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.18, 226.5a. See also C RANDALL ET AL., 
supra note 182, at 2-67 et seq.; Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 
2d 1087 (2000). For examples of suits claiming violations under the Truth in 
Lending Act and/or state Fraud statutes, see, e.g., Arriaga v. Cross Country Bank, 
163 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (2001); Hale v. First USA Bank,  N.A., 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8045 (2001); Dimick v. First USA Bank, N.A., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20910 (2000). 
187 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). See also  In re Maxwell, 281 B.R. 101, 123-24 (“The 
purpose of the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act, Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 140D, § 1 et seq., (MCCCDA) and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 
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Interpretive Notes and Decisions accompanying TILA’s opening 
section elaborate that the purpose of TILA is “to help correct what 
Congress perceived as widespread consumer confusion about the 
nature and cost of credit obligations.”
188 The design of “meaningful 
disclosure” must take into account consumers’ underestimation bias. 
The proposed intervention goes beyond the current scope of 
TILA.  The goal is not only to educate consumers about credit terms, 
but also to educate them about their own preferences and cognitive 
biases.  Knowledge of credit terms is meaningless if the consumer 
mistakenly believes that she will not borrow.
189 
Overcoming the underestimation bias will not be easy.  Only 
statistical information can be disclosed.  The issuer can only be forced 
to inform the consumer that on average she will borrow more than 
she anticipates.  And existing evidence suggests that disclosure of 
statistical evidence is not always convincing.  In particular, if the 
disclosed average level of borrowing is taken across a large group of 
consumers, any individual consumer may believe that she is among 
the few who will not borrow.
190 
The efficacy of a disclosure policy would increase if the disclosed 
information, although necessarily statistical, is individualized.  For 
instance, issuers can be required to remind the consumer that she did 
in fact borrow in the past.  Such information cannot be dismissed by 
the consumer as an abstract statistic that does not apply to her; 
                                                                                                                  
U.S.C.S. §1601 et seq., is to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that 
the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms 
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer 
against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.”) 
188 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a), Interpretive Notes and Decisions. 
189 Therefore, the question whether Regulation Z reasonably classified over-limit 
fees as “other charges" under 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)(5), rather than as a "finance 
charge" under 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) – a question which the Supreme Court has 
accepted for review during the 2003-04 term (Pfennig v. Household Credit Services, 
Inc., No. 00-4213 (6
th Cir., July 2, 2002), cert. granted Household Credit Services, 
Inc. v. Pfennig,  No. 02-0857 (June 27, 2003)) – is of lesser significance, if 
consumers underestimate the importance of both finance charges and over-limit 
fees.  Similarly, the recent Dēmos proposal to improve disclosure of penalty rates 
and fees might not be as effective as its advocates hope.  See Tamara Draut & Javier 
Silva, Borrowing to Make Ends Meet: The Growth of Credit Card Debt in the ‘90s 
41 (Dēmos, 2003) (hereinafter “Dēmos”).  
190 Compare: A vast majority of drivers believe that their driving skills are above 
average. See Svenson, supra note 117. See also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1542 (1998) (people tend 
to underestimate their future risks even if they actually understand average risks). 
But  see W.  KIP  VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED  ROOMS 163 (2002) (suggesting that 
provision of information regarding the risks of smoking was effective in 
overcoming the optimism bias, leading individuals to recognize the risk to them 
personally); Jolls & Sunstein, supra  note 181, at 24-5 (disclosure exploiting 
availability and salience can affect individuals’ risk perception). 
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although the consumer could still believe that her past borrowing is 
not indicative of her future choices.
191 
Individualized disclosure can also be implemented with respect to 
the repayment rate.  Consumers’ inclination to pay only the minimum 
required payment each month can be combated by forcing issuers to 
add an appropriate warning on the credit card bill.  Such a warning 
might read: “Debt Increasing – At current repayment rate, it will take 
you 34 years to repay your debt and you will end up paying 300% of 
the principal.”
192  Such an individualized warning, tailored to the 
consumer’s actual repayment record, should be more effective than 
the general warning that Congress is currently considering.
193  More 
broadly, the fact that issuers are currently using their control of the 
credit card bill to induce minimum payments suggests that requiring 
certain disclosures on the credit card bill may be effective.
194 
Disclosure can be even more effective if the information is 
provided before the end of the billing cycle.  According to a recent 
proposal by Ronald Mann, issuers would be required to provide point-
of-sale information.
195  For instance, if by charging a current purchase 
to a certain credit card the consumer would exceed her credit limit on 
that card thus incurring a $29 fee, this information would be provided 
to the consumer, allowing her to use a different card or an alternative 
payment system.  
Information-based intervention has been proven feasible and 
effective in other contexts.  Mandatory warnings on cigarette or drug 
                                                 
191 On the advantages of individualized disclosure, see generaly Jolls & Sunstein, 
supra note 181.  See also BARRY NALEBUFF & IAN AYRES, WHY NOT? 181 (2003) 
(arguing that issuers should be required to disclose to consumers the likelihood that 
they will incur late and over-limit fees, preferably based on individual data that the 
issuer collects on the specific consumer).  Cf. Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, In 
Praise of Honest Pricing, 45 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 24 (2003) (discussing the 
potential advantages of individualized disclosure in the cell-phone market). 
192 See supra Section II.A.6. A similar disclosure is mandated by TILA for closed-
end credit. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.18 (h) (requiring the creditor to disclose “[t]he total 
of payments, using that term, and a descriptive explanation such as "the amount you 
will have paid when you have made all scheduled payments"). According to a 
recent survey, many holders of bank-type cards “said it would be helpful to include 
on their billing statement information about the length of time it would take to pay 
off the balance if only the minimum payment were made each month.” Durkin, 
supra note 46, at 629. 
193  See  Section 1301 of H.R. 975, 108
th Cong. (2003).  A more individualized 
version of Section 1301, proposed in H.R. 1052, 107
th Cong. (2001), was soundly 
defeated by the issuers’ lobby. 
194 See supra Section II.B.6. Indeed, intervention in issuers’ billing practice fits 
squarely within the purpose of TILA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (“to protect the 
consumer against inaccurate and unfair billing and credit card practices.” (emphasis 
added)). See also 12 C.F.R § 226.7 (Regulating the “[p]eriodic statement”). And at 
least some observers recognize that current intervention in billing practices is 
insufficient. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Lessons from the 
Truth-in-Lending  Act, 80 GEO.  L.J. 233, 236 (1991) (“The confusion about the 
meaning of the Act's disclosures would suggest that it provided rather uncertain 
protection against inaccurate or unfair billing.”). 
195 See Mann, supra note 40. 
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packaging are a prominent example.
196  The success of the anti-
smoking and anti-drug advertisement campaigns is also suggestive.
197  
Perhaps the modern tendency to finance consumption with debt, 
without a complete understanding of the future repercussions of such 




2.  Default Rules and Unsolicited Offers 
 
“Nothing is more ubiquitous in our mailboxes than the 
preapproved credit card offer.”
199  Over five billion solicitations were 
mailed in 2001—more than forty-five mailings to every household in 
America,
200 providing the average household with $1 million of credit 
every four years.
201  The ease with which consumers can obtain credit 
cards via unsolicited offers exacerbates the identified failure in the 
credit card market.  Individuals tend to make fewer mistakes when a 
decision involves higher costs.  It is rational to invest more, e.g. in 
improving one’s understanding of the future implications of a 
contract, when there is a cost associated with signing the contract.  
                                                 
196 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq. 
197 With respect to cigarette smoking, Congress required the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to “conduct and support research on the effect of cigarette smoking 
on human health and develop materials for informing the public of such effect;… 
collect, analyze, and disseminate (through publications, bibliographies, and 
otherwise) information, studies, and other data relating to the effect of cigarette 
smoking on human health;… undertake any other additional information and 
research activities.” See 15 U.S.C. §1341(a). See also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 
181, at 25-26 (describing how effective disclosure was achieved regarding the 
effects of cigarette smoking using availability and salience); VISCUSI, supra note 
190, at 136 et seq. (describing warnings and other modes of providing information 
on the risk of smoking, and their effects on risk perception and on smoking 
behavior).  
198 Recognizing the force of advertising may justify regulation of the marketing 
techniques employed by credit card issuers. See Laurie A. Lucas, Integrative Social 
Contracts Theory: Ethical Implications of Marketing Credit Cards to U.S. College 
Students, 38 AM.  BUS.  L.J. 413, 415-16, 422 (2001) (“Marketing credit to 
unsophisticated consumers, even with TILA compliance, is problematic.”) See 
generally Jon Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some 
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV.  L.  REV. 1420, 1433 (1999) 
("[C]ognitive heuristics [like peripheral cues] allow people to simplify 
decisionmaking through short cuts or rules of thumb; both mechanisms, when 
manipulated by researchers or marketers, can also lead to consistently misguided 
decisionmaking."). Indeed, Congress has not shied away from intervention in 
issuers’ marketing strategies. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1663 (regulating the advertising 
of open end credit plans).  
199 Howard, supra note 128, at 63. 
200 Id. at n. 1, quoting The Depository Institution Regulatory Streamlining Act of 
1999: Hearing on H.R. 1585 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit of the House Banking and Financial Services Comm., 106
th Cong., 
1
st Sess. (1999) (statement of Frank Torres, Legislative Counsel, Consumers 
Union). See also Dēmos, supra note 105, at 37 (reporting statistics on credit card 
solicitations). 
201 NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, supra note 143, at 259. 
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Unsolicited offers reduce this cost to a bare minimum. Therefore, 
stricter scrutiny of unsolicited offers is justified.
202 
For instance, it may be desirable to categorically prohibit the use 
of penalties, negative amortization rates and even some types of teaser 
rates in unsolicited offers.  Even critics of usury ceilings—which are 
considered in greater detail below
203—should be less troubled by the 
capping of interest rates in unsolicited offers.  The objection in the 
name of freedom of contract would lose at least some of its force, if a 
sophisticated consumer, who really wants a high interest rate, can get 
it by requesting and completing an application.  In other words, in 
restricting the range of permissible terms in unsolicited offers the law 




3.  Unbundling 
 
As explained above, the distorted pricing pattern observed in the 
credit card market is the product of the underestimation bias on the 
one hand and the bundling of transacting and borrowing on the other 
hand.  Therefore, it might be desirable to consider policy responses 
that would unbundle these two distinct services.
205 
In fact, even absent legal intervention the market has taken the 
first step towards the unbundling of transacting and financing services 
with the invent of the debit card.  Debit cards, however, are at best 
only an imperfect substitute for credit cards, even on the transacting 
dimension.
206  One way to help the debit card in presenting a real 
                                                 
202 The special problems inherent in unsolicited offers have been recognized before. 
In many European countries direct mailing of card solicitations is entirely 
prohibited.  See E VANS  &  SCHMALENSEE,  supra note 13, at 190. Regulation Z 
distinguishes between “applications” and “solicitations,” where the consumer is not 
required to complete an application. See 12 C.F.R § 226.5a(a)(1). In the past credit 
card issuers would send out unsolicited credit cards, not only unsolicited offers. 
This even more dangerous marketing technique was banned by Congress. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1642 (“No credit card shall be issued except in response to a request or 
application therefore.”). 
203 See infra subsection 4. 
204 See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 159 (defending a weak type of paternalism 
that focuses on default rules); Camerer et al., supra note 159, at 1224-30 (same).  
Default rules, however, may be more powerful than commonly believed – see, 
generally, Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998). 
205 Compare: unbundling in the computer software industry (unbundling Microsoft 
Windows from Microsoft Office) and in the telecommunications industry 
(unbundling local and long-distance services). 
206 See supra note 141.  The evidence suggests that debit cards are substituting for 
checks, not for credit cards.  The recent rise of the debit card has mirrored a decline 
in the use of checks, without any significant effect on the use of credit cards.  See 
Mann, supra note 40. 
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alternative to the credit card is by restricting the benefits programs 
that credit card issuers can offer.
207 
Unbundling can also be affected by requiring issuers to allow 
automatic payment of credit card balances from the consumer’s 
checking account (commonly located in a different bank).
208  A  
consumer, who chooses this automatic payment option, in effect 
transfers her borrowing business from the credit card issuer to her 
local bank.  With the interest-bearing borrowing business stripped 
away, the issuer would no longer be able to exploit the consumer’s 
underestimation bias. Moreover, the automatic payment option would 
practically eliminate the problem of late and over-limit fees. 
 
4.  Reconsidering Usury 
 
I now turn to consider a more controversial policy—usury 
ceilings.  The underestimation theory, by qualifying the main anti-
usury arguments, opens the door to a serious reconsideration of usury 
in the credit card context. 
Underestimation of future borrowing has been shown to result in 
biased competition, which leads to skewed pricing and inefficiency in 
the credit card market.  Therefore, it is natural to consider the use of 
price regulation as a policy response to the identified market failure.  
Specifically, if underestimation of future borrowing steers 
competition in the credit card market away from the interest rate 
dimension, resulting in high interest rates, then policymakers should 
consider imposing usury ceilings as a policy response.
209  
Importantly, as soon as usury ceilings lower the interest rate 
charged on credit card debt, the remaining price elements will self-
correct.  In particular, if issuers’ financing revenues drop, then they 
will not be able to set a zero annual fee or to offer lucrative benefits 
programs.  Thus, the proposed usury law will have the direct effect of 
lowering interest rates as well as the indirect effect of adjusting the 
short-term non-contingent elements of the credit card contract.
210 
A credit card usury cap will likely induce issuers to readjust their 
pricing practices—to place more weight on the short-term elements of 
                                                 
207 Cf. Mann, supra note 40 (proposing legal restrictions on benefit programs for 
different reasons). 
208 While common in most other countries, this automatic payment option is not 
available in many U.S. banks. 
209 Eric Posner provides a different externality-based argument for usury ceilings 
and other restrictions on the extension of credit. See Posner, supra note 168. 
210 For a recent proposal to enact a national usury law – see Dēmos, supra note 105, 
at 39-40.  A related form of price regulation would target late and over-limit fees.  
See D ēmos,  supra note 105, at 40.  Regulation can also target the short-term 
elements of the credit card price.  For instance, restrictions could be imposed on 
teaser rates (either directly or by limiting the permissible difference between the 
teaser rate and the post-introductory rate) and benefits programs.  By restricting 
competition on the short-term elements, such regulation would likely ignite 
competition on the long-term elements of the credit card price. 
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the credit card price.  But the overall price of the credit card need not 
change.  Thus, the underestimation theory qualifies the traditional 
objection to usury ceilings, namely that such price regulation would 
only limit the availability of credit, hurting the very consumers it sets-
out to protect.  If the overall price of credit would not change, the 
overall supply of credit would remain unaffected. 
Moreover, it should be emphasized that setting usury caps for 
credit cards is distinctly different from a general usury law that affects 
all forms of credit.  The underestimation theory identified a 
vulnerability unique to credit card borrowing (and other related forms 
of open-end credit).  Accordingly, the considered usury ceilings 
would apply solely to credit card borrowing.  Other forms of credit 
would be left untouched.  Thus, the common objection that usury laws 
would limit the availability of credit to the detriment of consumers 
has only limited force.  While a credit card usury law might induce 
substitution from credit card borrowing to alternative forms of 
financing, it need not significantly limit the overall availability of 
credit. 
Still, price regulation via usury caps is fraught with well-known 
problems.  I therefore stop short of advocating a reinstatement of 
usury ceilings.  The preceding analysis should nevertheless clear 




B.  Ex Post Judicial Review 
 
1.  Contract Law 
 
In theory, contract law could be used to police credit card 
contracts and to affect the desired adjustments in credit card pricing. 
In practice, however, ex post judicial review of credit card contracts is 
probably not the optimal method of legal intervention.  Given the 
institutional constraints on common law adjudication, it may well be 
better to leave the regulation of credit card contracts to legislatures 
and administrative agencies.  Indeed, courts have been reluctant to 
intervene in credit card contracts. 
 
                                                 
211 To further minimize the cost of usury ceilings the following measures should be 
considered.  First, the price regulation need not take the form of mandatory fixed 
low interest rates.  It is the inflexible nature of traditional usury laws that led to their 
abolition.  See infra Section I.B.1, n. 34.  Usury ceilings can and should be variable 
rates, defined as a maximum surcharge above some benchmark rate (e.g. the prime 
rate).  See Rougeau, supra note 32, at 40 et seq. (describing more recent proposals 
advocating a “floating cap on interest”).  Second, usury laws could allow rates to 
vary also in accordance with specified risk characteristics of the borrower.  Third, 
the usury ceilings need not be too low.  Starting from the current high interest rates, 
a usury ceiling that modestly curbs observed practices may increase welfare, even 
when the policymaker lacks the information required to impose the optimal rate.   
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a)  Unconscionability 
 
At first glance, the doctrine of unconscionability might seem to 
be a natural policy lever for legal intervention in credit card 
contracts.
212  Specifically, the contours of procedural 
unconscionability could be expanded to account for the type of 
behavioral biases invoked by the underestimation theory.  And the 
systematic deviations from marginal cost pricing identified in this 
Article could inform a substantive unconscionability analysis.
213 
Yet courts have been very careful in applying unconscionability 
review to credit card contracts.  In particular, courts have generally 
rejected unconscionability claims made against arbitration clauses in 
credit card contracts.
214 Similarly, courts would likely shy away from 
unconscionability review of credit card pricing; and justly so.
215  
Unconscionability doctrine, by its very nature, cannot be tailored to 
the special needs of the credit card market.  And the potential ripple 






                                                 
212  See U.C.C. § 2-302; RESTATEMENT  (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208. 
Unconscionability review is most commonly applied to contracts between 
consumers and sophisticated corporations See,  e.g.,  E. Allan Farnsworth, 
CONTRACTS 314 (3
rd ed. 1999). In particular, unconscionability doctrine has been 
commonly invoked in form contract cases, where the more sophisticated party 
controls the contractual design. And, more specifically, uncosncionability has been 
used to police credit contracts. See Posner, supra note 168, at 305 (discussing the 
application of unconscionability analysis in credit cases). 
213 Korobkin, supra note 130, §§ V and VI, studies the efficacy of unconsionability 
doctrine in policing form contracts given consumers’ bounded rationality. 
214 See, e.g., Arriaga v. Cross Country Bank, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (2001); Bank 
One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819 (2001); Curtis Marsh v. First USA Bank, 
N.A., 103 F. Supp. 2d 909 (2000).  However, such claims have been occasionally 
upheld in extreme cases.  See, e.g., Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. 
Supp. 2d 1087, 1105 (2000) (“an arbitration provision  is substantively 
unconscionable because it waives class remedies, as well as declaratory and 
injunctive relief.”); Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 
785 (9th Cir. 2002) (arbitration clause that exempts drafter’s claims is most likely to 
be unconscionable).  See also Korobkin, supra note 130, at 1274-75 (discussing 
cases).  The potential danger in arbitration clauses can be explained by the 
behavioral theory suggested in this Article.  See infra Section VI.C.2. 
215 With respect to credit card interest rates, unconscionability review is likely 
preempted by federal law.  See Cade v. H & R Block, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19041, at *13-16 (D.S.C. 1993). 
216 As previously noted, ex ante regulation may provide a better solution. See Lewis 
A. Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF.  L.  REV. 1151 
(1976) (arguing that market imperfections leading to unconscionable contracts may 
be more amenable to legislative rather than to judicial correction).  The arbitration 
issue has, in fact, been taken up by Congress. See Consumer Credit Fair Dispute 
Resolution Act of 2001, S. 192, 107th Cong., 147 Cong. Rec. S587 (daily ed. 
January 25, 2001). 
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b)  The Penalty Doctrine 
 
Focusing on late and over-limit fees, a second common law 
doctrine, the penalty doctrine, provides a potential policy level for 
policing credit card contracts.  Contract law precludes the 
specification of damages for non-performance that exceed the true 
harm to the breached-against party, or a reasonable ex ante (at the 
time of contracting) estimate of such harm.  Such excessive damages 
are considered an unlawful penalty, and as such are not 
enforceable.
217  
It seems quite clear that in many cases the large penalties 
specified in the credit card contract greatly exceed the actual harm 
caused to the issuer, as well as any reasonable ex ante estimate of 
such harm.  This is specifically evident when the magnitude of these 
penalties is measured in fixed dollar amounts, typically around $30, 
regardless of the degree of deviation from the credit line or the 
tardiness in making the payment.
218  When a cardholder is required to 
pay a $30 fee for missing the due date on a $10 balance by only a few 
days this fee is clearly an illegal penalty. 
Consumers underestimate penalty-triggering borrowing as well as 
penalty-triggering forgetfulness, and consequently they underestimate 
the cost of penalties.  As a result, profit maximizing issuers, driven by 
competition, set high penalties.  Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook 
observed that issuers, when faced with consumers who exceed their 
credit limit or miss payments, often respond by charging the penalty 
fee (or the higher interest rate) and raising the credit limit.
219  Not 
only are issuers not losing from the breach of contract, but rather they 
are making the largest revenues from lending to these delinquent 
consumers.
220  
As compared to their reluctance to invoke the unconscionability 
doctrine, courts have been more susceptible to penalty claims raised 
against late and over-limit fees in credit card contracts.
221  Still, while 
the penalty doctrine may well be used in extreme cases, courts will 
often find it difficult to conduct the comprehensive analysis of an 
issuer’s cost structure that would be required to separate illegal 
penalties from reasonable liquidated damages.  Again, ex ante 
regulation may prove to be the superior alternative. 
 
                                                 
217 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356; U.C.C. § 2-718. 
218 See supra Section II.A.5. 
219 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 115. 
220 Id. 
221 See, e.g., Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1383 (1991) (class 
action claiming that bank’s “late” and “overlimit” fees are illegal liquidated 
damages); Hitz v. First Interstate Bank, 38 Cal. App. 4
th 274 (1995) (same). See 
generally Gary D. Spivey, Validity of Construction of Provision Imposing “Late 
Charge” or Similar Exaction for Delay in Making Periodic Payment on Note, 
Mortgage, or Installment Sale Contract, 63 A.L.R. 3d 50 (2001). 
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2.  Bankruptcy Law 
 
Bankruptcy law provides another policy lever for policing credit 
card contracts.  Bankruptcy law encompasses both ex ante regulation 
and ex post judicial intervention.  I begin with the debate over 
proposals to restrict the access of consumers with credit card debt to 
bankruptcy relief.  After concluding that these proposals are 
misguided, I proceed to examine other, potentially more constructive 
applications of bankruptcy law. 
 
a)  Maintaining Consumer Access to Bankruptcy Relief 
 
Facing skyrocketing default rates in the 1990s, credit card issuers 
lobbied for legislation that would restrict consumer’s access to 
bankruptcy relief.
222  A recent reincarnation of this proposed 
legislation is currently on Congress’ plate.
223  Issuers have also taken 
to the courts, increasing their challenges against the dischargeability 
of credit card debt based on 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A).
224   
The claim that such restrictions would cure the excessive 
borrowing problem has little merit.
   On the contrary, limiting the 
dischargeability of credit card debt would only increase the incidence 
of overextended consumers.  Limited dischargeability, by increasing 
issuers’ profits, would lead to an increase in the supply of credit.  On 
the demand side, however, the underestimation bias would prevent an 
offsetting decrease in the demand for credit.  Overall, such a policy 
could only exacerbate the excessive borrowing problem.
225  
Accordingly, the underestimation theory lends support to the 
recommendation of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission 





                                                 
222 See H.R. 2500, H.R. 3150 and S. 1301 introduced in the 105
th Congress, and 
“The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999,” introduced as H.R. 833 and S. 625 in the 
106
th Congress.  
223 H.R. 975, 108
th Cong. (2003). 
224 See Howard, supra note 128, at 63, 110 et seq. 
225 Ausubel, supra note 27, at 251, 264-5, 268-9.  The reasoning behind this 
conclusion is further elaborated in Ausubel’s testimony in front of the U.S. Senate: 
“The intuition for this prediction is that lenders will act on the change in bankruptcy 
law, whereas consumers will substantially fail to act.  As a result, lenders will 
increase the pace of solicitations and credit line expansions, while marginal 
consumers should not be expected to neutralize this effect by declining the lenders’ 
offers.”  Lawrence M. Ausubel, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions and Regulatory Relief of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs of the United States Senate, February 11, 1998.    
226 See Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. 
BANK. L.J. 483, 512 (1997). 
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b) Limiting the Rights of Credit Card Issuers 
 
In rejecting issuers’ attempts to limit the dischargeability of credit 
card debt, courts have exhibited a remarkable sensitivity to the type of 
concerns emphasized by the underestimation theory.  The Supreme 
Court, in Field v. Mans,
227 formulated a subjective test, according to 
which the debtor’s intent to repay is sufficient for dischargeability 
(i.e. it precludes the fraud allegation under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A)), 
even when there was no actual ability to repay.
228  This subjective test 
sits well with the behavioral theory advanced in this Article.  The 
underestimation bias leads the consumer to underestimate the 
likelihood of financial hardship, and thus to overestimate her actual 
ability to repay.  
Moreover, the courts have scrutinized the marketing techniques 
and screening procedures employed by credit card issuers, ruling that 
over-zealous solicitation without sufficient inquiry into the 
consumer’s ability to pay precludes any claim of non-
dischargeability.
229  According to Judge Snow credit card issuers are 
guilty of entrapment: 
  
“The issuers' attempts to deprive these casualties of the 
issuers' own lending practices of their fresh start in 
bankruptcy appeared presumptuous and gratuitous, thus 
motivating a number of courts to require strict proof of 
each element of the misrepresentation/reliance test to 
frustrate their efforts: Credit issuers are willing to risk 
nonpayment because the profits on finance charges exceed 
their risks. Thus, the same industry that seeks customers 
who will spend more than their means requests that 
discharge be denied to these customers because of an 
implied promise (which courts must infer) not to spend 
more than their means.”
230 
                                                 
227 516 U.S. 59 (1995). 
228  See David F. Snow, The Dischargeability of Credit Card Debt: New 
Developments and the Need for a New Direction, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, § III 
(1998). See also Alane A. Becket, Fifth Circuit Sets Its Standard for Credit Card 
Non-dischargeability, 2001 ABI JNL. LEXIS 183 (2001); John D. Sheehan, The 9th 
Circuit Clarifies Intent on Credit Card Debt Dischargeability, 1997 ABI JNL. 
LEXIS 94 (1997); Richard H. Gibson, Credit Card Dischargeability: Two Cheers 
for the Common Law and Some Modest Proposals for Legislative Reform, 74 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 129 (2000). 
229  See Snow, id. § III.B.3 (Where courts have considered industry’s credit 
screening practices, they have found they failed to establish justifiable reliance.) See 
also Howard, supra note 128, at 80 et seq. (behavior of creditor should also be 
considered in determining dischargeability, as it is in common law fraud).   
230 See Snow, id. at 80-1, quoting from In re Hernandez, 208 B.R. 872, 879 (Bankr. 
W.D. Tex. 1997). See also Gibson, supra note 228, at 155 (“Judge Snow argues, 
issuers aggressively push credit onto unsophisticated individuals who cannot handle 
it. Judge Snow is worried about entrapment.”)   




Bankruptcy courts are engaging in ex post scrutiny of issuers’ 
marketing techniques and screening procedures.  Scrutiny of the 
contractual design itself is a natural next step.  Teaser rates, high 
interest rates and low amortization rates can provide further evidence 
against an issuer’s claim of non-dischargeability.  Moreover, such 
contracting practices can theoretically be used not only as a shield, 
but also as a sword—to exclude credit card issuers from any recovery 
in bankruptcy.
231 
It is doubtful, however, that ex post scrutiny is the preferred 
means of intervention in the credit card market.  The courts’ struggle 
with §523(a)(2)(A) has not been an easy one.
232  And extending the 
scope of judicial review to the content of the credit card contract 
would not make things easier.  A better solution may revert back to ex 
ante regulation.  If issuers’ practices were regulated by clearer ex ante 




VI.  BEYOND CREDIT CARDS 
 
The preceding case study of the credit card industry and the credit 
card contract, and the implications drawn from it, are indicative of a 
much broader phenomenon, pertaining to many consumer contracts.  
                                                 
231 Cf. In re Jordan, 91 B.R. 673, 680 (1988) (Debtor objection to a proof of claim in 
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding asserting illegal late charges imposed by 
creditor). An even more extreme approach, borrowing from the concept of lender 
liability in the commercial bankruptcy context, would render the issuer liable to the 
bankrupt consumer’s other creditors. See COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, 
ch. 79 (2003). 
232 See, e.g., In re Dougherty, 84 B.R. 653, 657 (9th Cir. BAP 1988) (formulated a 
totality of the circumstances test examining a non-exclusive list of 12 objective 
factors relevant to dischargeability); In re Eashai, 87 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(Rejecting the totality of the circumstances test from In re Dougherty, and requiring 
proof of false representation, intent to deceive, justifiable reliance and actual 
damages); In re Ward, 857 F.2d 1082 (6th Cir. 1988) (requiring credit check as 
precondition for justifiable reliance); In re Anastas, 94 F.3d 1280 (9
th Cir. 1996) 
(“intent to deceive” factor interpreted to require investigation only of whether 
debtor intended to pay not whether debtor had ability to pay); In re Hashemi, 104 
F.3d 1122 (9
th Cir. 1997) (requiring creditor to show only that, as a whole, relevant 
evidence indicates debtor intended to pay); In re Rembert, 141 F.3d 277 (6th Cir. 
1998) (use of credit card implies a representation of an intention but not an ability to 
pay). 
233 In this spirit, H.R. 3146, 105
th Cong. (1998) proposed an amendment of the 
bankruptcy laws to restrict the claims of issuers who cause unsecured debts to 
exceed a certain debt to income ratio threshold. Lawrence Ausubel goes further to 
suggest an absolute time priority rule for unsecured debt. Such a rule would provide 
powerful incentives for credit card issuers to inquire into the consumer’s existing 
debt overhang before extending more credit. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Testimony 
Before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the 
Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, March 
10, 1998. 
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In Section VI, I discuss the broader teachings of the credit card case 
study.  The importance of these lessons is demonstrated through a 




A.  Pricing Anomalies and Behavioral Explanations 
 
Many consumer contracts are controlled by more sophisticated 
sellers, who design these contracts to exploit consumers’ imperfect 
will-power and imperfect rationality.  Market forces cannot be relied 
upon to cure such abuse.  In fact, they might exacerbate the problem.   
From a policy perspective, the preceding analysis demonstrated 
that observed pricing patterns can be used as indicators of a 
behavioral market failure.  Specifically, deviations from marginal-cost 
pricing in an otherwise competitive market should draw 
policymakers’ attention.
235  Pricing anomalies should be used to 
identify markets where legal intervention might be warranted. 
Importantly, however, my claim is not that every deviation from 
marginal-cost pricing, even in an otherwise competitive market, 
implies a behavioral market failure.  Deviations from marginal cost 
pricing are not uncommon.  In many industries the price of equipment 
is rather low while related consumables or services carry a high price 
that likely exceeds marginal cost.  The pricing of razors and razor 
blades, and the pricing of printers and ink cartridges (or paper) are 
illustrative.  While it is not unlikely that consumers’ behavioral biases 
are at least partially responsible for these pricing patterns, it may well 
be the case that asymmetric information or other non-behavioral 
                                                 
234 Before expanding from credit cards to consumer contracts generally, I should 
mention other financing arrangements that bear resemblance to the credit card 
contract, and are thus susceptible to the same type of problems identified in the 
credit cards market.  First and foremost, the analysis of credit card financing is 
largely applicable to open-end credit in general.  Hence, all forms of credit lines, 
secured and unsecured, are potentially suspect.  While the underestimation theory is 
most powerful with respect to open-end credit, close-end financing might also be 
susceptible to similar behavioral biases.  For instance, the predatory subprime home 
mortgage market is a close-end financing market that exhibits pricing patterns 
indicative of a behavioral market failure. For a thorough analysis of this market—
see Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1255 (2002). What Engel & 
McCoy identify as information asymmetry favoring lenders and brokers over 
consumers, is probably more accurately described as imperfect rationality. See id. at 
1280-1283 (referring to consumers’ lack of sophistication, and to their failure to 
understand the terms of the mortgage contract). On the policy level, federal and 
state legislation have targeted specific elements of the predatory mortgage contract 
(e.g. various penalties) that are especially vulnerable to the underestimation bias. 
See id. at 1311-12. 
235 Schwartz and Wilde suggest looking at pricing patterns to identify markets 
where competition is imperfect, specifically due to insufficient search. See Alan 
Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect 
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).   
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factors are the dominant force behind such pricing schemes.  Each 
market must be thoroughly studied before the true source of an 
observed pricing pattern can be identified.  This Article urges scholars 
and policymakers to engage in such market analysis.  The justification 
for legal intervention as well as the appropriate form of regulation 
depends on the results of such inquiry. 
 
B.  Cell Phones 
 
The cell phone market is an important example of another 
economically significant market
236 where, despite apparent 
competition, anomalous pricing schemes suggest the possibility of a 
market failure.
237  As in the credit card market, competition might be 
pressuring providers of wireless communication services to exploit 
consumers’ imperfect perceptions of the future.  Anomalies both in 
the pricing of wireless phone services and in the design of contracts 
for such services deserve special attention.  
Perhaps the most apparent anomaly concerns the steep jump in 
per minute charges when the consumer exceeds the plan limit.  A 
recent study found that most contracts specify an increase of over 
100% in the per-minute price, with some contracts specifying 
increases of 200% and beyond.
238  Clearly, these huge increases do 
not reflect a corresponding change in the provider’s per-minute cost.  
The high prices set for minutes beyond the plan limit target 
consumers’ underestimation of their future use of the cell phone.  As 
with credit card borrowing, consumers might overestimate their future 
will-power; they might underestimate the likelihood of events that 
require more air time; and they might simply underestimate the 
likelihood that they would inadvertently exceed the plan limit.  The 
underestimation of future use biases competition toward the short-
term elements of the contract.  As in the credit card market, the result 
                                                 
236 The average cellular subscriber spends around $600 a year on cellular services. 
In total, consumers spend tens of billions of dollars a year on cellular services (not 
including amounts spent on purchasing cellular phones). And the industry is 
growing rapidly. See Jerry Hausman, Cellular Telephone, New Products and the 
CPI, NBER WORKING PAPER No. 5982, at 3, 6 (1997); Good News in a Turbulent 
Time, WIRELESS  NEWS, Oct. 31, 2002 ("Wireless technology continues to show 
robust growth.”) 
237 Much of what is said below about the cell phone market applies also to another 
increasingly important market – the ISP (Internet Service Provider) market.  Other 
subscription markets also exhibit similar pricing patterns, indicative of a behavioral 
market failure. 
238  See DellaVigna & Malmendier, supra note 92, tbl. 4; 
http://www.verizonwireless.com (quoting markups in excess of 200% for minutes 
beyond the plan limit). Sprint PCS and AT&T Wireless similarly quote markups in 
excess of 300% for minutes beyond the plan limit (based on personal 
communications with Sprint PCS and with AT&T Wireless, 8/29/2003). See also 
NALEBUFF  &  AYRES,  supra note 191, at 178-79 (describing the high post-plan 
minute prices as ‘hidden pricing’). 
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is high long-term prices coupled by short-term perks—free phones, 
free voice mail, lower short-term prices, etc.
239 
A second troubling feature of the wireless service contract is the 
common lock-in clause, which ties the consumer to the specific 
provider for as long as two years.
240  The lock-in clause targets 
consumers’ underestimation of the many contingencies that would 
induce them to end the contract earlier—the appearance of a more 
attractive offer from another provider, a change in their need for 
wireless services, or an unanticipated financial hardship that renders 
the monthly cell phone bill to painful to bear.  In addition, hyperbolic 
discounting, and the short-sightedness it implies, explains consumers’ 
underestimation of the cost of lock-in. As with high prices for minutes 
beyond the plan limit, it seems difficult to justify the lock-in clause on 
cost grounds.  In some industries, fixed costs may justify a lock-in 
clause.  But the per-consumer fixed costs in the cell phone industry 
hardly seem capable of justifying the lengthy lock-in clauses observed 
in this industry.  Rather, it is the underestimation bias that enables 
providers to lock in consumers.  Competition is powerless in fighting 
lock-in.  It can only dissipate providers’ lock-in profits by pushing for 
short-term perks.
241 
The identified pricing and contracting practices in the cell phone 
market imply the existence of a behavioral bias and its exploitation by 
providers of wireless communication services.  Closer scrutiny of the 
cell phone market might thus be warranted. 
    
C.  Other Contracts 
 
The credit card and cell phone examples feature developed 
markets that can be subjected to elaborate ex ante regulation, when 
anomalous pricing and contracting practices suggest a market failure.  
However, inefficient pricing and contracting also occur in other 
contexts, where there is no developed market.  The framework 
developed in this Article is also applicable in these contexts.   
From a descriptive perspective, the behavioral model can explain 
observed contracting practices.  From a normative perspective, the 
model can at the very least inform judges and regulators.  The absence 
                                                 
239 Interestingly, some providers have recently started offering “roll-over” minutes, 
suggesting that consumers are becoming more sensitive to at least some long-term 
components of the wireless service contract. 
240 Providers offer different short-term perks to tempt consumers into choosing 
service plans with longer term commitments. See offers at http://www.attws.com 
(waiving the activation fee for consumers choosing a 2 year plan); 
http://www.spritpcs.com (charging an additional fee of  $10 a month if a consumer 
does not commit for at least 1 year); http://www.verizonwireless.com (requiring 
either a 1 year or a 2 year commitment, and waiving the activation fee for 
consumers choosing a 2 year plan). 
241 See Ayres & Nalebuff, supra note 191, at 24 (noting that competition in the cell-
phone market focuses on the short-term, free phone dimension). 
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of a developed market precludes some forms of ex ante regulation, 
perhaps even the forms of regulation that were found to be most 
attractive in the credit card example.  Still, other forms of ex ante 
regulation as well as ex post judicial review remain viable policy 
instruments.  
To demonstrate the broad applicability of the proposed 
framework, I first discuss the famous Williams v. Walker-Thomas 
Furniture Co.
242 case.  I then expand the analysis to the general case 
of pro-seller provisions in breach contingencies. 
 
1.  Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture  
 
Credit transactions, with their unique temporal ordering of costs 
and benefits are especially susceptible to the underestimation bias.   
One of the more problematic forms of consumer credit is the 
installment purchase contract, where the purchased goods serve as 
collateral for the credit that the seller extends.
243  Perhaps the most 
famous, and extreme installment purchase case is Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co.
244  Williams, who supported herself and seven 
children, regularly purchased furniture and home appliances from a 
seller on installment credit.  According to the contract signed by 
Williams, the seller retained title to each item purchased from the 
seller until the buyer finished paying in full for all the items.  Until the 
buyer brought her total unpaid balance to zero, the seller could 
repossess any and every item purchased.  And when Williams missed 
a payment the seller sought to invoke this repossession provision.
245 
The D.C. Circuit held that in common law, courts can and should 
refuse enforcement of unconscionable contracts or provisions.  The 
appellate court remanded the case, ordering the trial court to consider 
whether the repossession provision was unconscionable.
246  
The standard economic analysis of the Williams case is critical of 
the court’s interventionist approach.  Williams is described as a credit 
risk.  The increased likelihood of that she would default renders an 
apparently harsh contract a business necessity.  The seller, so the 
argument goes, would not be able to stay in business without the 
assurance provided by the repossession clause; and consumers in 
                                                 
242 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
243 See Robert H. Skilton & Orrin L. Helstad, Protection of the Installment Buyer of 
Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1476-77 
(1967). See also William C. Whitford, The Appropriate Role of Security Interests in 
Consumer Transactions, 7 CARDOZO  L.  REV. 959, 978, 986 (1986) (invoking 
behavioral biases in support of stricter scrutiny of loan contracts with tangible 
collateral); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229,  267-75 
(1998) (Cognitive biases and excessive discounting of future costs may justify 
restrictions on the enforceability of forfeiture clauses in credit sales). 
244 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
245 Id. at 447. 
246 Id. at 448-450. 
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Williams’ position would only be harmed if the seller went out of 
business.
247 
Other accounts dispute the conclusion that a less harsh contract 
would force the seller out of business.  These alternative accounts 
defend the unconscionability ruling in Williams, arguing that given 
the seller’s (local) monopoly, restricting the range of tolerable terms 
would only redistribute wealth to consumers. 
A third, behavioral approach argues that Williams was not aware 
of the relevant term in the contract, or that she did not fully 
understand its implications.
248  The behavioral model developed in 
this Article, while following this third approach, offers a more refined 
interpretation of the contracting environment in the Williams case.  
Even if Williams read the relevant term and understood its formal 
implications, she might still have underestimated the practical 
importance of this clause.  Williams, when making the early 
purchases, may have underestimated the likelihood of purchasing 
additional items from the same seller, or she may have naively 
believed that she would never miss a payment.  Due to the 
underestimation bias, Williams may have been insufficiently sensitive 
to the inclusion of the repossession clause.  
And, arguably, the seller designed the installment purchase 
contract to exploit buyers’ behavioral biases.  As in the credit card 
and cell phone examples, the underestimation bias may have induced 
the seller to offer a pricing scheme with short-term benefits and long-
term costs.  Williams was lured in by the attractive purchase price, 
only to later face the threat of repossession.  
Importantly, the underestimation theory is consistent with the 
standard economic understanding that the seller in Williams was not 
making any supra-competitive profits.  The underestimation theory, 
however, diverges from the standard account in its refusal to imply 
efficiency from the absence of supra-competitive profits.  If Williams’ 
behavioral bias led her to underestimate the true cost of the contract, 
there is no guarantee that the contract was welfare increasing.
249 
For reasons discussed above, the underestimation theory does not 
necessarily imply the desirability of the unconscionability ruling in 
Williams.  It does suggest, however, a novel perspective on the 
category of contracts epitomized by the Williams case. 
 
 
                                                 
247 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. 
& ECON. 293, 305-315 (1975). 
248 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 
47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 241-42. 
249 For a related behavioral account of the Williams case – see Russell Korobkin, A 
“Traditional” and “Behavioral” Law-and-Economics Analysis of Williams v. 
Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, UCLA School of Law, Law & Economics 
Research Paper No. 03-24 (2003). 
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2.  Pro-Seller Provisions in Breach Contingencies 
 
Extrapolating from the analysis of the Williams case, the 
behavioral model developed in this Article suggests that consumers 
might underestimate the importance of contract provisions that govern 
breach contingencies.  In particular, at the ex ante stage when the 
contract is signed the consumer might underestimate the probability 
of breach—either on her part or by the seller.
250 
Therefore, sophisticated sellers would rationally attempt to lure 
consumers with low prices and attractive short-term perks, while 
loading their contracts with provisions that impose high costs on 
consumers in the event of breach.  High liquidated damages, liability 
waivers, and one-sided arbitration clauses are common examples of 
contractual provisions that shift costs to breach contingencies. 
In fact, the law does subject many provisions that govern breach 
contingencies to special scrutiny.  The penalty doctrine is a prime 
example.
251  Regulation of warranties and liability waivers is 
another.
252  Limitations on arbitration clauses provide a third 
example.
253  Finally, the state consumer protection statutes and/or 
unfair and deceptive trade practices statutes that where inspired by the 
Federal Trade Commission act
254 may also be used to scrutinize pro-
seller provisions in breach contingencies.
255  The underestimation 
theory provides a new perspective on these legal rules.
256 
                                                 
250  See Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal 
Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL  L.  REV. 717, 731-32 
(2000) (cognitive biases lead parties to underestimate the likelihood of breach); 
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1784 (2000) (contracting parties might underestimate the likelihood of 
breach); Jeff Sovern, Toward A Theory of Warranties  in Sales of New Homes: 
Housing the Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and 
Consumer Psychologists under One Roof, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 13, 35, 100 (Since 
consumers, when buying a house, might underestimate the risk of defects, and thus 
fail to purchase a warrantee, legal intervention may be warranted.). 
251  See R ESTATEMENT  (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356; U.C.C. § 2-718. For a 
related behavioral account of the penalty doctrine – see Eisenberg, supra note 248, 
at 225 et seq.; Eisenberg, supra note 250, at 1779-89.  
252  See U.C.C. §§ 2-312 – 2-318.  See also U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (prohibiting 
limitations on consequential damages for personal injury in consumer contracts). 
253 Courts have been cautious in the enforcement of arbitration clauses that seem 
excessively one-sided. See Korobkin, supra note 130, at 1274 (“many [courts] have 
struck down such clauses when the specific arbitration clause at issue appears 
preferential to the seller . . . .”). Congress has also taken up this issue. A host of 
recent bills propose to prohibit mandatory arbitration in a variety of specific 
contractual contexts. See Consumer Credit Fair Dispute Resolution Act of 2001, S. 
192, 107
th Cong., 147 Cong. Rec. S587 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2001); Civil Rights 
Procedures Protection Act, S. 163, 107
th Cong, 147 Cong. Rec. S530 (daily ed., Jan. 
24, 2001) (employment contracts); Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1140, 107
th Cong, 147 Cong. Rec. S7195-96 (daily ed. June 
29, 2001). 
254 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)-(m)(1982). 
255  See Comment, Consumer Protection: The Practical Effectiveness of state 
Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 59 TUL. L. REV. 427 (1984) (collecting and 




VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
In consumer contracts highly sophisticated corporations will 
often exploit consumers’ behavioral biases.  Competition cannot cure 
such exploitation.  On the contrary, competitive forces compel sellers 
to take advantage of consumers’ weaknesses.  Therefore, legal 
intervention may well be required to protect consumers and to 
increase social welfare.  Pricing anomalies should be used as 
indicators of market failure, signaling the need for legal intervention. 
 
                                                                                                                  
examining statutes); Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions 
Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade 
Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (1980) (same). 
256 Expanding from the consumer contract to the employment contract, the 
underestimation model might supports stricter scrutiny of at-will employment 
provisions, employment arbitration clauses, and the increasingly common non-
compete clauses. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The 
Limited Return of the Common Law, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1783, 1800-01 (1996) 
(employees will often underestimate the implications of no fault severance); Rena 
Mara Samole, Real Employees: Cognitive Psychology and the Adjudication of Non-
Competition Agreements,  4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 289, 320 (2000) (“Courts, as 
well as legislatures must begin to use empirically accurate accounts of human 
cognition in order to produce more consistent and adequate treatment of 
agreements.”). 
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